## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR.,

Crim. No. 17-201-1 (ABJ)

Defendant.

## **STATUS REPORT**

The United States of America, by and through Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III, files this status report to apprise the Court of a recent development in *United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr.*, No. 1:18-cr-83 (E.D. Va.) that is pertinent to this Court's upcoming sentencing decision. Attached to this status report as Exhibit A is the transcript from the sentencing hearing on March 7, 2019.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT S. MUELLER III Special Counsel

Dated: March 11, 2019 By: /s/

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## EXHIBIT A

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                     UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
 2
                          ALEXANDRIA DIVISION
 3
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, : Criminal Action No.
 4
                                 : 1:18-CR-83
 5
                 versus
 6
    PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR.,
                                 : March 7, 2019
 7
                      Defendant. :
         -----x
 8
                       TRANSCRIPT OF SENTENCING
 9
                BEFORE THE HONORABLE T.S. ELLIS, III
                     UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
10
    APPEARANCES:
11
    FOR THE GOVERNMENT:
                                UZO ASONYE, AUSA
12
                                United States Attorney's Office
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13
                                Alexandria, VA 22314
                                     and
14
                                ANDREW WEISMANN, SAUSA
                                GREG D. ANDRES, SAUSA
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                                BRANDON L. VAN GRACK, SAUSA
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## Case 1:17-cr-00201-ABJ Document 544 Filed 03/11/19 Page 4 of 99

			2
1	Appearances continued: KEVIN	DOWNING, ESQ.	
2	Law Of	fice of Kevin Downing w Jersey Avenue NW	
3		gton, DC 20001	
4	and RICHAR	d WILLIAM WESTLING, ESQ.	
5		n, Becker, & Green, PC 5th Street NW	
6		gton, DC 20037	
7		M. HARRIS, RPR District Court, Ninth Floor	
8	401 Cc	urthouse Square dria, VA	
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	Tonia M.	Harris OCR-USDC/EDVA 703-646-14	38—

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1 PROCEEDINGS 2 (Court proceedings commenced at 4:00 p.m.) 3 THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon. I apologize 4 to some of you as we're a little late starting. I had a naturalization ceremony from 2:00 to 3:30 that took a little 5 longer than I expected. 6 7 All right. You may call this next matter, please. THE DEPUTY CLERK: Court calls Criminal Case, United 8 9 States of America versus Paul J. Manafort, Jr. Case 10 No. 2018-CR-83. 11 May I have appearances, please. First for the 12 Government. 13 MR. ANDRES: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Greg Andres, Uzo Asonye, Brandon Van Grack, Andrew Weissmann and 14 15 Special Agent Sherine Ebadi for the Government. 16 THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon to you. 17 MR. DOWNING: Good afternoon, Your Honor. For 18 Mr. Manafort, Kevin Downing, Thomas Zehnle, Rich Westling and 19 Brian Ketcham. Good afternoon. 20 THE COURT: Good afternoon to all of you, and good 21 afternoon, Mr. Manafort. 22 (Defendant nods.) 23 Typically, I will begin with asking counsel whether 24 they had an adequate opportunity to review the presentence 25 investigation report and to review it with their client, in

-U.S. v. Manafortthis case, Mr. Manafort, but it's apparent to me that from the 1 2 mountain of briefs that have been filed, that you've had an adequate opportunity and that you have expressed fully the 3 views of each side on this. 4 But I will confirm, Mr. Manafort, have you had an 5 adequate opportunity to review the presentence report and to 6 7 review it with your counsel? THE DEFENDANT: I have, Your Honor. 8 9 THE COURT: And are you fully satisfied with -- you don't have to get up. I understand there's discomfort in 10 11 that. You don't have to get up. 12 Are you fully satisfied with the advice and counsel 13 that has been provided to you by your counsel in this case? 14 THE DEFENDANT: I am, Your Honor. 15 THE COURT: All right. And as I said, it's apparent 16 to me that, Mr. Downing, you and your colleagues have had an 17 adequate opportunity to review it. 18 MR. DOWNING: We have, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: And, Mr. Andres, you and your colleagues 20 have had an adequate opportunity to review it? 21 MR. ANDRES: Yes, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: All right. So the way in which we will 23 proceed now, which is typical, is that we will take up first 24 the various objections that have been asserted to the facts, 25 conclusions and calculations contained in the presentence

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report, so that I can fulfill the first duty, which is to ensure that the sentencing guidelines are accurately and appropriately calculated.

As I'm sure most of you, if not every one of you, knows, the sentencing guidelines are advisory. They are not mandatory as they once were. They're one factor for the Court to take into account in imposing an appropriate sentence. And there is a statute that itemizes the factors the Court is required to consider in imposing an appropriate sentence, and the guidelines is merely one of those factors.

Now, let me begin by being clear that what

Mr. Manafort is before the Court for sentencing on today.

Mr. Manafort is before the Court for sentencing, having been found guilty by a jury of eight counts: five counts of failure to file tax returns, accurate tax returns; one count of failure to file report of a foreign bank account; and two counts of bank fraud.

So he was found guilty of eight counts. The jury could not reach a unanimous decision as to ten counts. I dismissed those without prejudice. They were hung counts. In the end, Mr. Manafort has admitted to the conduct constituting those other counts. So they are part of the related conduct that is considered by the Court in sentencing in this case. He admitted to those facts in the District of Columbia's Statement of Facts. I think I have that right, do I not?

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1 MR. ANDRES: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Do I have it right,

3 Mr. Downing?

MR. DOWNING: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Now, so the next -- he is not before the Court -- let me underscore, he's before the Court for those counts on which he's been found guilty and the related conduct. And the counts that were hung, the facts of those are also to be part of the sentencing consideration. He is not before the Court for any allegation that he or anybody at his direction colluded with the Russian government to influence the 2016 presidential election.

And there is much discussion about why the special prosecutor has it. I would remind those of you that I faced that issue at the beginning of this case. There was a motion brought by the defendant, arguing that the indictment being pursued by the special prosecutor was illegitimate. I heard that case, and I issued an opinion, and I concluded that it was legitimate. The grant of power to the special prosecutor was broad enough to cover this.

That's in the record of this case for those who are interested. That doesn't mean that I decided the wisdom or appropriateness of delegating to special prosecutors broad powers that are not at times -- or a subject matter. But I didn't have to decide that. It's not before me. What was

-U.S. v. Manafort-7 before me is was this prosecution authorized from -- or 1 2 legitimately, and I concluded that it was, and so we went ahead and had the trial. Now -- so he's not before the Court 3 4 for anything having to do with colluding with the Russian government to influence this election. 5 6 Now, the first issue, the first objection, it seems 7 to me, to take up is the defendant's objection to the 8 presentence investigation report on the ground that the presentence report proceeded on the basis of Section 2S1.3 10 rather than 2T1.3. In other words, the defendant argues that 11 the tax guidelines, not the FBAR, or failure to report a 12 foreign bank account guideline, applies in this case. 13 That's still a disagreement, Mr. Downing? MR. DOWNING: It is, Your Honor. 14 15 THE COURT: And as a concession to this -- to the shortness of life, would I be fair in concluding that you've 16 17 said everything you need to say in your briefs? 18 MR. DOWNING: We have, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: Mr. -- all right. Mr. Andres, have 20 you-all said everything you have to say on that issue in your 21 briefs? 22 MR. ANDRES: Yes, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: All right. The objection is overruled. 24 However, having said it's overruled, let me explain what 25 happened because history is important. What has happened in

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1 | this country on this is important.

But at the bottom line, it is my conclusion that the sentencing guideline of 2S1.3 was appropriately applied by the probation officer, and the reason for that is quite clear in the language of the guidelines. It really emits of no other conclusion. The problem arises, as the defense counsel had pointed out in their brief thoroughly, for years the Department of Justice didn't do that. For years, the Department of Justice calculated the guidelines and went forward.

They did it, I think -- I don't know this, I'm speculating here, but I think it was done because it led to pleas using lower guidelines under 2T rather than 2S, because the conduct of failing to report a foreign bank account and failing to file a tax return that reflected the income that you earned in a foreign bank really was the same conduct essentially. It hid income earned or placed overseas.

So in December of 2017, the Justice Department did a -- not an about-face, but it changed from imposing or insisting on the use of Section 2S1.3 rather than the 2T, and that resulted in guidelines that were higher rather than lower.

And the defendant argues that the government should -- that should be what the government continues to do. What, in fact, must be done is that the guidelines must be --

-U.S. v. Manafort-9 the offenses must be grouped, and I find that the probation 1 2 officer -- the probation officer correctly grouped the 3 quidelines. The first five counts, failure to report tax, is 4 grouped with the FBAR account, the failure to report the 5 6 foreign bank account. So those six counts are grouped 7 together and treated as a group for the quideline purposes. 8 And even though five of those, if they were alone, would be 9 treated under 2T, when they are grouped with the FBAR -- or 10 the foreign bank account report -- count, that leads to a 11 higher guideline. The guideline manual makes clear that the 12 Court must go to the higher guideline, which is what was done 13 here, and I am in agreement with that. So that objection is 14 overruled. 15 Now, the next objection that was asserted -- if I 16 miss one, Mr. Downing, you correct me -- but I think the 17 second one is the organizer or leader under 3B1.1(a); is that 18 correct? 19 MR. DOWNING: A moment, Your Honor. 20 THE COURT: Yes. 21 (A pause in the proceedings.) 22 MR. DOWNING: Your Honor, the order may not be 23 important, but I think the intended loss, the specific intent 24 loss. 25 THE COURT: All right. Under what provision?

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-U.S. v. Manafort-
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              MR. DOWNING: It would be 1.1 --
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              THE COURT: Are you talking about the -- this
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    is the -- under the bank accounts, the bank fraud?
              MR. DOWNING: Correct.
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              THE COURT: No, let's deal with the -- any
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 6
    objections to the failure to report and FBAR counts.
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              MR. DOWNING: Okay.
 8
              THE COURT: Those are grouped together. And as to
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    those, I think the next one is the organizer or leader.
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    probation officer imposed a four-level enhancement on the
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    ground that Mr. Manafort directed Gates and others to do
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    various things which were illegal, and that that warrants the
    four-level enhancement. She also concluded that it was
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14
    otherwise extensive.
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              Now, Mr. Downing, I've read your brief on that, but
    you may want to emphasize what you think merits or warrants
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17
    emphasis in that regard.
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              MR. DOWNING: Your Honor, Mr. --
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              THE COURT: Paragraph 32 of the PSR.
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              MR. DOWNING: Yes, Mr. Westling is going to handle
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    this if it pleases the Court.
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              THE COURT: All right. Mr. Westling.
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              MR. WESTLING: Thank you, Your Honor. Yeah, very
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    briefly, we did, I think, fully brief this, but I think we
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    feel strongly that there wasn't a showing here of leadership
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in the classic sense under that enhancement.

Obviously, Mr. Gates testified they were doing this together, but it didn't seem like it was either the appropriate degree of leadership or that it was sufficiently extensive to warrant that four-level enhancement, and that's the reason for the objection.

THE COURT: Well, you're right that it's been fully briefed, and let me say for both sides that your briefs were quite thorough and clear and appreciated.

The commentary to 3B1.1 includes people like bookkeepers, tax preparers, people in Cyprus, all the people involved. They don't have to be violators themselves. They can be unknowing service providers. But they have to be under the direction and they were under the direction of Manafort and Gates, and I find that 3B1.1(a) applies and that the four-level enhancement is appropriate. So that is overruled. That objection is overruled.

Next, we go to the next objection, which is the loss attributed to the bank fraud charges. Now, here, we might -- I might need a little more argument, Mr. Downing or Mr. Westling. Let me go down this list so that we're talking about the same thing.

I think it's useful in this regard to look at the chart in the presentence report that appears in -- the chart that appears at paragraph 64. Who will argue this,

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    Mr. Downing?
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              MR. DOWNING: Mr. Westling.
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              MR. WESTLING: I will, Your Honor.
              THE COURT: All right. Mr. Westling, do you have
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 5
    that chart in front of you?
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              MR. WESTLING: I do, Your Honor. Thank you.
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              THE COURT: Now, the first one, the victim of
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    Citizens Bank loan, and that was a loan for $2.7-plus million
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    and a $682,000 line of credit. And I think the probation
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    officer concluded that there was no loss from that one. Do
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    you agree with that?
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              MR. WESTLING: That's correct, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: All right. Now, we come to the next
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    one.
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              And you don't disagree with that either, do you,
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    Mr. Andres?
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              MR. ANDRES: No, Your Honor.
              THE COURT: All right. But the next one, I think,
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19
    does have a disagreement. That's the Banc of California loan
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    for a million dollars, and I think the original presentence
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    report transposed some figures, which we found out. The loss
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    in that was 684,448 is the loss that the probation officer
23
    ultimately found.
2.4
              Now, Mr. Westling, do you dispute that loss?
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              MR. WESTLING: Your Honor, we don't.
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-U.S. v. Manafort— 13 1 THE COURT: All right. So then we come to the 2 Citizens Bank loan, which is the loan for 377 Union Street. 3 Now, this is sort of an interesting one. It's an interesting one because this was a million-dollar loan -- I'm sorry, a 4 \$5.5 million loan that never closed; is that right? 5 6 MR. WESTLING: That's correct, Your Honor. 7 THE COURT: And so it never closed. Nonetheless, there is convicted conduct or maybe it's admitted conduct, I 8 9 don't remember which, but it's conduct where there is fraud 10 against -- or the Citizens Bank in New York because a 3 -- or 11 a \$5.3 million loan that was already encumbering the property 12 was not disclosed in the loan application. Do I have that 13 right? MR. WESTLING: That's the allegation, Your Honor, 14 15 yes. 16 THE COURT: All right. Now, as I understand, your 17 argument is, distilled to its essence, no harm, no foul. The 18 loan was never made, and therefore, there was no loss to which 19 the Government answers that you still must take advantage --20 or take advantage -- take account of the intended loss. And 21 there the intended loss is the full amount of the loan, 5.5 22 million. 23 I think I know your argument there, but let's state 24 it so Mr. Andres can have a target to shoot at. 25 MR. WESTLING: Well, Your Honor, I think we were

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looking at the provision of the guidelines that deals with the specific intent of the defendant at the time of the loan. And this was, you may recall from the testimony at trial, a situation where Mr. Manafort had actually disclosed this loan, that the collateral's encumbrance, by the time this later loan occurred. There were two loans at Citizens --

THE COURT: Yes, but this loan never closed.

MR. WESTLING: That's correct, and it was second in time. So by the time the bank did the application in July, they had an e-mail from Mr. Manafort back in April saying there was a new mortgage on the property. And so we take the position that contrary to what the Government has argued, which is that they had -- the bank discovered it on its own, and that was true for the first loan.

When it came to the second loan, Mr. Manafort had given them that information and, therefore, was trying to be clear. In fact, the bank restructured the loan in order to deal with that encumbrance, and it eventually didn't get made. But this isn't -- I think the argument was that because he didn't disclose that, it somehow meant he was trying to get one over on the bank.

There was admittedly false statements submitted in connection with the loan, so we're not bickering with that issue. It's simply a matter of when he submitted those with the intent to pay the loan and prevent there from being a

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loss. And in our view the facts developed at trial suggest that's exactly what happened.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Andres?

MR. ANDRES: Your Honor, we have a dispute about the facts and the trial evidence. Mr. Manafort specifically did not disclose the Genesis Capital loan as part of that loan application to Citizens Bank, nor did he ever disclose it before the bank found out about it. So there's no evidence that he ever -- when you review both the loan application and the testimony of Taryn Rodriguez, which was on pages 1911 to 1917, he specifically did not disclose it.

Now, there's history to the reason why he did not disclose it. Mr. Manafort had a prior loan from Citizens Bank for Howard Street, the first loan that you went over in that chart. In that loan -- in that application, he also specifically failed to disclose that, and he sought to secure false documents to submit to the bank to show there wasn't a loan on that property.

So you may remember the testimony of Rick Gates, who testified that at Mr. Manafort's direction, he contacted the insurance broker and the insurance broker provided a fraudulent document that didn't include that loan so it could be submitted to the bank.

So in the first instance, he didn't disclose it in the first application, and then obviously making a loan to the

-U.S. v. Manafort-16 same bank, he could not have disclosed it a second time 1 2 because they would have found out about the first loan. 3 he specifically intended to not disclose that. 4 So at the time, he intended the bank to lose \$5.5 million because he hid what, in effect, was the 5 6 collateral or the collateral had a lien consistent with the 7 case law that we cited. THE COURT: Was the 5.3 loan docketed or recorded? 8 9 MR. ANDRES: At the -- yes, it was recorded, Your Honor, and the bank --10 11 THE COURT: So how in the world could anybody who's 12 a lawyer think that anybody is going to be fooled about 13 whether there was a loan on there before closing, because clearly that would have been discovered. And why wouldn't it 14 15 be reasonable to conclude that the failure to disclose the 5.3 16 loan was a -- an error, a mistake, they would argue, by a busy 17 man rather than fraud, a deliberate intent to deceive? 18 MR. ANDRES: For two reasons, Judge. First, he got 19 away with it once before. That is in the prior loan -- in the 20 prior application to the same bank. He failed to disclose it 21 and secured the loan, not having disclosed it, although as you 22 say, the bank found out about it. Secondly --23 THE COURT: And it never closed. 24 MR. ANDRES: No, the first loan did close. The first Citizens -- this is the second loan to the same bank. 25

-U.S. v. Manafort-17 1 THE COURT: Oh, yes, go ahead. 2 MR. ANDRES: And the second reason is that 3 Mr. Manafort has agreed in his D.C. plea that he hid a loan on the Union Street property. So I'm reading from Paragraph 51 4 in the Statement of Offense in the Washington, D.C. plea, 5 where as Your Honor noted, Mr. Manafort admitted to the 6 7 equated conduct here in the Eastern District of Virginia. So there's really no dispute about the fact that 8 9 Mr. Manafort has admitted to hiding the loan in question. 10 THE COURT: What's the standard of Scienter that's required for this? In other words, suppose someone does it, 11 12 fails to disclose a loan carelessly, inadvertently. Is that sufficient? 13 14 MR. ANDRES: So let me just -- for the purposes of 15 the conviction at trial, obviously we had to prove that beyond 16 a reasonable doubt that it was intentional, right? So the 17 Government proved and Mr. Manafort has acknowledged his guilt 18 that he intentionally hid these loans as part of his 19 admissions --20 THE COURT: Because that was Count 28, right? 21 MR. ANDRES: Correct. 22 THE COURT: All right. Go on. 23 MR. ANDRES: I -- if we're talking about it as a 24 matter of sentencing, generally, as Your Honor knows, there's 25 a different standard of proof, but --

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              THE COURT: But as you point out, the jury has
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    already foreclosed that.
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              MR. ANDRES: Well, the jury didn't -- the jury
    didn't convict Mr. Manafort on this count.
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              THE COURT: On 20 -- that's right, 26 and -- just a
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    moment.
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               (A pause in the proceedings.)
              THE COURT: All right. 25 and 27 is what he was
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9
    convicted of, correct?
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              MR. ANDRES: Correct.
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              THE COURT: And --
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              MR. ANDRES: This is loan -- this is Count 28.
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              THE COURT: 28. So the jury made no determination
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    on this count.
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              MR. ANDRES: Correct. And as part of his plea in
    Washington, D.C., in the district court, Mr. Manafort admitted
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    the conduct that was acquitted here and in -- specifically in
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    paragraph 51 --
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              THE COURT: I don't have any doubt that he admitted
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    that conduct. The thing that I'm having difficulty with, and
    I think you may explain it in the same way, which might repeat
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    it, I should find that he intended Citizens Bank to lose
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    $5.5 million, right?
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              MR. ANDRES: Correct.
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              THE COURT: Now -- and that loan never closed, but
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-U.S. v. Manafort-19 nonetheless, if he intended a loss of 5.5 million, then under 1 2 the sentencing guidelines, he should be charged with that. I'm still quizzical about why anybody who's a lawyer would 3 4 think that a recorded loan could be kept secret from a bank. MR. ANDRES: Your Honor, putting aside whether or 5 not it was wise or whether or not it would succeed. 6 7 Manafort has said that he specifically sought to hide that 8 loan. THE COURT: Yes. All right. MR. ANDRES: So that's what the evidence is. And, 10 11 again, putting aside that it didn't succeed because the bank 12 found it out --THE COURT: It couldn't succeed. I don't know of 13 any bank that doesn't do a record search on a title. But your 14 15 point is he admitted it. 16 MR. ANDRES: And in the first loan, it did succeed. THE COURT: The first loan, which one is that on our 17 chart? 18 MR. ANDRES: So that would be the first loan in the 19 20 chart, the Citizens Howard. 21 THE COURT: As to which there was no loss. 22 MR. ANDRES: As which -- as to which there was no 23 loss, but there was a -- it was a loan application, and on 24 that loan application, Mr. Manafort was required to disclose 25 the prior liabilities, including this loan that we're

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-U.S. v. Manafort—
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 1
    discussing.
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              THE COURT: Right. And it succeeded there because
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    the loan issued, but we now know that the bank suffered no
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    loss as a result of that.
              MR. ANDRES: Correct. And when I say "succeed,"
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    what I mean, obviously, is that the loan was approved by the
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 7
    bank.
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              THE COURT: Interesting. Stunning, isn't it, that a
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    bank would miss a recorded loan on a piece of property?
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              MR. ANDRES: No comment.
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              THE COURT: All right.
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              MR. ANDRES: Thank you, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Is there anything you want to add,
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    Mr. Westling?
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              MR. WESTLING: Just briefly, Your Honor.
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    understand there are admissions in the D.C. case, and I think
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    what we focused here is on the requirement that obviously he
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    purposely sought to inflict harm on the bank, and we simply
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    don't believe that standard is met by what's before the Court.
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              THE COURT: And that, you say, as well is in the
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    admissions; is that right, Mr. Andres?
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              MR. ANDRES: Well, Mr. Manafort pled quilty to bank
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    fraud, and so he was intentionally trying to defraud the bank,
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    which would necessarily --
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              THE COURT: Yes, but what in D.C. did he say in --
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-U.S. v. Manafort-21 1 with respect to intending this loss? 2 Let's come back to this, Mr. Andres. I'll give you 3 an opportunity to look at it, but you see the point I'm curious about. 4 The point I'm curious about is what precise standard 5 must I apply, under the guidelines, to finding that there was 6 7 this intended loss? Mr. Westling has told me what he thinks 8 the standard is. Tell me again, Mr. Westling. 9 MR. WESTLING: That he purposely sought to inflict 10 harm on the bank, Your Honor. THE COURT: Well, that doesn't tell me a lot. 11 12 Purposely sought to inflict harm on the bank, that's what he 13 says. But, you think about it. This isn't -- I'm not going 14 through this whole thing without one recess. 15 MR. ANDRES: Yeah, just -- Judge, just so I don't lose the thread. The standard is that the Government has to 16 17 prove by a preponderance, for the guidelines purposes, that he 18 intended --19 THE COURT: Intended the loss. 20 MR. ANDRES: Intended the loss to be five point --21 THE COURT: And you see, that's where I stumble. 22 That's where I stumble because I find it hard to find by a 23 preponderance of the evidence. But, I'm going to look again 24 at what you cited me to -- I don't want to do it here -- at 25 the D.C. stuff. But it seems to me that it's hard to believe

-U.S. v. Manafort— 22 1 that a lawyer would believe that he could get -- he could fool 2 a bank into not finding a \$5.3 million loan that's recorded. 3 It seems to me that that might have been inadvertence or something else; I don't know. But let's pass it for a while 4 5 6 MR. ANDRES: Okay. 7 THE COURT: -- and come back to it. 8 I think I understand your position, but I want to 9 give you one more opportunity, and you as well, Mr. Westling, 10 to address the \$5.5 million intended loss with respect to the 11 377 Union Street loan by Citizens Bank. 12 Now, let's turn to the next one, which is a loss of 13 207,000 on the Federal Savings Bank. Is there any dispute 14 about that, Mr. Westling? 15 MR. WESTLING: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. And you don't have a 16 17 dispute? 18 MR. ANDRES: No, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: All right. So then we go to the Federal 20 Savings Bank loan for the 377 Union Street. This is the 21 second one, a \$6.5 million loan, and that, the probation 22 officer concluded no loss. You don't have a problem with 23 that, Mr. Westling? 24 MR. WESTLING: No, Your Honor. 25 THE COURT: And Mr. Andres?

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 1
              MR. ANDRES: No, Your Honor.
 2
              THE COURT: So really the only dispute -- guidelines
 3
    dispute we have is whether or not there should be a
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    $5.5 million intended loss with respect to 377 Union Street,
 5
    and I'll come back to that.
 6
              MR. ANDRES: Thank you.
 7
              THE COURT: And in that regard, Mr. Andres, I
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    will -- I'm going to take what you say and look at the D.C.
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    material. You're telling me that, first of all, they pled
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    quilty to bank fraud. So this -- that should, in you view,
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    end the matter. But I will look at that once more carefully.
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              MR. WESTLING: Your Honor --
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              MR. ANDRES: Thank you, Judge. It's specifically
14
    paragraph 51 on page 22, and I'm happy to hand up a copy.
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    We've submitted it separately, but I'm happy to hand it up if
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    that's easier.
              THE COURT: No, I don't need it.
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              MR. ANDRES: Okay.
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              MR. WESTLING: Just a fine point, Your Honor.
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    apologize for interrupting. But he didn't plead guilty to
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    bank fraud in D.C., he admitted the conduct.
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              THE COURT: That's right. He didn't --
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              MR. WESTLING: I just want to make sure we're clear.
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              THE COURT: You're exactly right. He didn't plead
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    quilty to bank fraud there, but he -- in the course of that
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-U.S. v. Manafort-24 plea in D.C., he admitted the conduct. 1 2 MR. WESTLING: That's correct, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: Now, why don't you tell me very 4 succinctly why you don't think that ends the matter? MR. WESTLING: Because I think admitting the 5 6 elements of bank fraud does not cover the issue of whether one 7 intended a loss. There's all kinds of methods of defrauding a 8 bank that don't necessarily mean you don't plan to pay the 9 loan, and I think the guideline's key to that issue. 10 THE COURT: And, Mr. Andres, I'll give you the last 11 opportunity. 12 MR. ANDRES: Yeah. Again, I would just refer to the Statement of Facts in D.C., where he specifically says that he 13 14 didn't -- that he basically conspired to defraud the bank of 15 \$5.5 million. I don't know that there's any other way to defraud a bank and not intend it to lose the money that you're 16 17 securing from the loan. 18 THE COURT: Yes. It's not a momentous issue in the 19 overall sentencing calculus. It's sort of interesting because 20 there is an interplay here of plea negotiations in another jurisdiction affecting this case, and that's unusual. 21 22 All right. I think we have dealt with all of the 23 loan . Now, let me deal with one other subject with respect 24 to the bank loan. I think there is a current dispute between 25 the parties on restitution. I think the defendant says wait

-U.S. v. Manafort— 25 on restitution until these properties are resolved, sold or 1 2 something else; is that right, Mr. Westling? Mr. Downing? Either one of you. 3 MR. WESTLING: Your Honor, I think to be clear, 4 5 we're -- we were just wanting to ensure that there would be an appropriate offset for anything that came from that process so 6 7 that --THE COURT: Yes. I think Mr. Andres would be 8 9 willing to agree with that or Mr. Asonye. A cameo or more? 10 MR. ASONYE: We'll see, Your Honor. We do agree, 11 and it is in paragraph 3 of the restitution order, the offset 12 language. 13 THE COURT: All right. The restitution order has 14 now been handed to me. It was given to the clerk today, 15 right? 16 MR. ASONYE: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: I'm not an instant reader, so that'll be 17 something I will do at the first recess. 18 19 All right. So I have that one issue that I'm going 20 to consider. Are there any other objections -- there are, I 21 believe -- to the presentence report that I should consider at 22 this time? 23 For those of you in the courtroom, once I resolve 24 all of the objections to the presentence report, then I will 25 have a final offense level and criminal history. He's a

-U.S. v. Manafort-26 Criminal History Category I; that is, he has no criminal 1 2 history. That will have the guideline calculation and that will be one factor for the Court to take into account, and we 3 4 will then go to argument and allocution, which is where the government and the defendant get to tell me what they think 5 should be the disposition of this sentencing. 6 7 And Mr. Manafort will have the opportunity, if he 8 wishes, to address the Court and to say anything at all he 9 wishes to this Court by way of extenuation or mitigation or not at all if he wishes. It's entirely up to him. So that's 10 11 what we have left. 12 Now, just a minute. Let me see if I see -- we 13 haven't done the role in the offense yet, have we, 14 Mr. Westling? 15 MR. WESTLING: We have, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: We have. That's right; I did conclude 17 that. I don't think there is anything left. There is no adjustment for obstruction of justice, and there is no 18 19 adjustment for -- oh, acceptance of responsibility. 20 All right. I do want to hear from you a bit on 21 this. The guidelines --22 (A pause in the proceedings.) 23 THE COURT: The quidelines provide for a credit,

THE COURT: The guidelines provide for a credit, under the guidelines calculation, for a defendant's acceptance of responsibility. And the probation officer did not give

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-U.S. v. Manafort-27 Mr. Manafort a credit for acceptance of responsibility, and 1 the reason for which is that he exercised his constitutional 2 right to go to trial. He denied the -- his guilt under those 3 counts and went ahead with trial. 4 5 Now, that doesn't foreclose acceptance of responsibility. You can still get acceptance of 6 7 responsibility even if you go to trial, and the guidelines 8 make that clear, but they do so in a provision that states 9 that -- well, let's get it in argument. 10 But I think it's very clear under the law that a 11 defendant who exercises his right to go to trial can 12 nonetheless receive credit for acceptance of responsibility, 13 but it's fairly limited, the circumstances under which a defendant can receive that. I think if defendant had gone 14 15 ahead in the District of Columbia and his cooperation agreement had not been terminated, was it, Mr. Andres or 16 17 Mr. --18 MR. ANDRES: Breached, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: Yes, but what -- was it terminated? 20 MR. ANDRES: The -- what happens with the breach is, 21 effectively, the defendant loses his rights under the 22 contract, but the government doesn't. So it's not that -- the 23 contract doesn't get ripped up. 24 THE COURT: So from his point of view, it was 25 terminated.

-U.S. v. Manafort-28 MR. ANDRES: Yes, breached. But yes, that's the 1 2 effect. 3 THE COURT: All right. And so in that circumstance, 4 you get to use his Statement of Facts, but he does not get acceptance of responsibility. 5 6 MR. ANDRES: He doesn't allow -- he's not allowed to 7 withdraw his plea, which is the same thing that the Statement 8 of Facts stands, his plea stands. 9 THE COURT: Now, the argument I'm going to hear --10 and I want you to put some flesh on it, Mr. Downing -- he 11 spent 50 hours with the special prosecutor. You would say, 12 your words, not mine, spilling his guts, and I gave you those words. They weren't yours. But it would be what I'd be 13 14 arguing. 15 In any event, he didn't get it because they didn't 16 believe he was truthful. But why do you think he gets under 17 the circumstances? And you don't need to argue about 18 obstruction, because the obstruction is not an impediment to 19 acceptance of responsibility in this case. 20 MR. DOWNING: Sure. Thank you, Your Honor. Just a 21 couple of things. One, to start out with the fairly obvious, 22 this is a very unusual case. So we're --23 THE COURT: I think it's worth -- nobody here denies 24 that. 25 MR. DOWNING: Right. And I think because of the

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- 1 process that was -- surrounds this case, the Office of Special
- 2 | Counsel, the way in which the case was handled, I think we
- 3 ended up at trial for that very reason. I think if we would
- 4 have been faced with this same case by the local U.S.
- 5 Attorney's Office, we may never have had a trial.

standpoint to avoid having gone to trial.

- So I'd like the Court to consider the fact that when
  we went into this case, the Court even observed that this case
  was overcharged, and at the end of the day, 10 of the 18 did
  hang. But there was not a process in place from our
- Now, at trial, I think, we did not step into any of
  the areas where the sentencing guidelines say if you do the
  following at trial, you cannot get acceptance. After the
  trial was over, and I know this Court doesn't get into pleas
  and plea negotiations, we were able to have much more
  productive discussions and reach a plea agreement shortly
- 18 THE COURT: In D.C.

after the end of this trial.

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- MR. DOWNING: In D.C., correct. Again, Your Honor, a bifurcated trial I don't think would have existed if the U.S. Attorney's Office had brought the case.
- So I think these are a lot of extenuating circumstances around the consideration that after this trial, shortly thereafter, once we were able to get into productive discussions with the Office of Special Counsel, there was a

-U.S. v. Manafort-30 1 resolution and there was immediate acceptance of 2 responsibility for Mr. Manafort's conduct with respect to the 3 hung counts. And we think all of that should be considered by 4 the Court, the unusual circumstances and what followed. 5 THE COURT: Well, yes, I don't question that, and I don't think Mr. Andres does, that I can take that into account 6 7 under 3553. But his argument is you don't get the three-level 8 reduction; am I right, Mr. Andres? 9 MR. ANDRES: Correct, Your Honor. Two-level reduction. 10 11 THE COURT: I beg your pardon? 12 MR. ANDRES: It would really just be a two-level reduction. 13 14 THE COURT: It would be. You're correct. 15 MR. ANDRES: I don't think the third point is really an issue because the Government hasn't made a motion. 16 17 THE COURT: You're quite right. Go on. 18 MR. DOWNING: Well, again, I think all these 19 attenuating circumstances around this particular trial, it's 20 very odd because ordinarily all of the counts would be in one 21 case and you wouldn't have a conviction and a plea. But 22 because of the odd nature of what happened here -- and 23 obviously we exercised Mr. Manafort's constitutional rights to 24 be tried in the appropriate venue. 25 Certainly, the outcome of him getting acceptance

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shouldn't change because he exercised his constitutional rights, and that's really what we would like the Court to consider.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Andres.

MR. ANDRES: Your Honor, it certainly is true that all these -- the Government offered to indict Mr. Manafort in Washington, D.C., as to all the counts that he wanted to be tried in the appropriate venue, and there's certainly nothing wrong with that.

I would say the following: There's nothing unusual about the fact that evidence is submitted to a grand jury, that that grand jury returns an indictment, that before this Court, Your Honor heard argument on all of the relevant motions, including the motion to dismiss. The case -- the jury was picked by both sides under Your Honor's supervision, and that jury convicted Mr. Manafort. And for that case, he is not entitled to acceptance of responsibility.

What the guidelines says is if you go to trial to preserve a legal issue, if there's a novel legal issue that you want to appeal or something along those lines, then you could get -- still get acceptance of responsibility because you've accepted your guilt as to those facts or to those crimes, but you want to preserve your legal appeal.

That's not what happened here. What happened here is Mr. Manafort vigorously defended himself on the facts and

have brought Mr. Manafort's cooperation, had he cooperated, to the Court's attention. But there's certainly nothing to indicate that we would have -- that we would have accepted a

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-U.S. v. Manafort-

1 | reduction for acceptance of responsibility.

Moreover, what I would say to Your Honor, and again, I don't want to mix the D.C. and Eastern District of Virginia cases, but there's a pertinent fact, which is the Fourth Circuit has said that post-plea -- post-arrest and post-plea conduct is relevant to acceptance of responsibility. And a judge -- the judge in Washington, D.C., Judge Jackson, has found that Mr. Manafort has both lied to the Government and lied to the grand jury.

And so that's also relevant to Your Honor's determination about whether or not he's accepted responsibility.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Mr. Downing.

MR. DOWNING: Your Honor, one of the difficulties here is -- and we pointed this out in our briefing. The Office of Special Counsel is presenting this Court with fact finding by another court that is still open to reconsideration because of subsequent evidence that was presented by the Office of Special Counsel.

So I have not been -- I've been doing this for a long time. I've never been in the situation where open fact finding in another case is affecting the Court's decision on sentencing in this case.

THE COURT: Yes, I take your point, and I'm also

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sensitive to the fact that this isn't your first rodeo nor is it anybody's here first rodeo, except Mr. Manafort's.

I just had occasion to recognize that I've been here 32 years and I have seen a great deal. And the one thing I think everyone here would have to agree with is this is unusual. It's unusual because of the attention this case gets. Look at the courtroom. It's filled.

I sentence people -- and there's an overflow courtroom. I sentence people every week. I have sentenced large numbers of people in the past 32 years for a lot of conduct, some of it far more egregious than this and some of it less, rarely have a courtroom even close to this filled, which is unfortunate. It's unfortunate because a lot of the sentences I impose need to have publicity so that they have general deterrent effect.

I don't know, as an empirical matter, whether there is any deterrent effect to sentences. I hope so. But that, I think, remains to be empirically tested. I know years ago I had to sentence young people who were mules, drug mules from Colombia, the country of my birth. They came up here with drugs and I sentenced them to a mandatory minimum of ten years in prison.

And, of course, these were young kids essentially, teenagers and 20's, who were told, here, take these drugs.

They'll -- if they find them, they'll just deport you. Well,

-U.S. v. Manafort-35 that's true, but only after ten years in Uncle Sam's custody. 1 2 And I thought that failing to give people notice of that in 3 Colombia, Madine, and other places, was wrong, immoral. 4 So I ordered the government to put signs up in these airports and I smugly told myself that that would make some 5 6 difference. Not in the slightest. So I don't know about 7 general deterrence, but it is still a congressionally mandated consideration under 3553, and I hope it has some effect. 8 9 And, of course, I also am fully aware of the fact 10 that they hung pickpockets in 18th and 17th Century England. 11 But every time they had a hanging, pickpockets showed up. So 12 that gives you a sense of the deterrent effect. We'll come to 13 that later. But let's get back to this now. 14 Did you finish what you wanted to say, Mr. Downing, 15 about --16 MR. DOWNING: The only other issue that I wanted to 17 bring up is that even in the D.C. case, that the Office of 18 Special Counsel has conceded that the issue of the breach in 19 the agreement might only go to one of the pled counts. 20 So I feel like we are a lot further away from one of 21 the two counts in D.C. and in a position where I think that 22 issue should be of --23 THE COURT: Well --24 MR. DOWNING: -- little relevance to this Court. 25 THE COURT: All right. But I take it you would urge

-U.S. v. Manafort-36 me -- you would agree that if I agree with Mr. Andres that he 1 2 should not receive acceptance of responsibility, you would 3 still urge me to take into account and to consider the fact 4 that he spent 50 hours with the special prosecutor and 5 cooperated there, and that isn't where he lied apparently -or is it, Mr. Andres? 6 7 MR. ANDRES: It's one of the places where he lied. 8 THE COURT: All right. 9 MR. ANDRES: He lied both in the proffers and before 10 the grand jury. 11 THE COURT: All right. So he lied in other places. 12 MR. DOWNING: However, I do think it stands to be 13 emphasized that there were two limited issues for which at the 14 end of the day, the judge found that Mr. Manafort lied. 15 There's one issue that's open to a motion to reconsider now. 16 THE COURT: Is that -- and this is under seal? 17 MR. DOWNING: Yes. It seems like everything is 18 under seal. 19 THE COURT: Why is it under seal? The public ought 20 to know about these things. 21 MR. ANDRES: Your Honor, it's not all under seal. 22 There is a public order which Judge Jackson issued and --23 THE COURT: Well, that's her decision. I'm not 24 second-guessing that. She should do whatever she thinks is 25 right, and I'm sure she will. But I hope, at the end of the

U.S. v. Manafort-37 1 day, all this will be unsealed. MR. ANDRES: Understood, Judge. It's part under 2 3 seal because there's a continuing investigation. If I could just briefly address several points? 4 One, even if Your Honor put aside the fact that a 5 6 federal judge in Washington has found that Mr. Manafort lied 7 to the government and the grand jury for the purposes of acceptance of responsibility, there's no Fourth Circuit law, 8 9 at least none that the defense has cited and none that we've 10 found, where defendant vigorously contests his guilt and the 11 facts at trial and gets acceptance. 12 Second of all, the government is not -- is opposing 13 the imposition of acceptance of responsibility in Washington, 14 D.C., as well. So the notion that Mr. Manafort's argument is: 15 I accepted responsibility and I should be getting acceptance 16 of responsibility for my plea, it's not going to happen with 17 respect to his plea in Washington, D.C. -- or I shouldn't 18 predict what the judge is going to do; I'm not suggesting 19 that. But the government opposes acceptance there as well as 20 the acceptance here. 21 THE COURT: All right. Your arguments, as usual, 22 have been helpful, and it illuminates a number of facts. But 23

it's the guidelines terms that govern this decision.

As I said and as the guidelines reflect, conviction by trial does not automatically preclude a defendant from

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consideration for such a reduction. In rare situations, according to the guidelines, a defendant may clearly demonstrate an acceptance of responsibility for criminal conduct even though he exercises his constitutional right to trial. This may occur, for example, where a defendant goes to trial to assert and preserve issues that do not relate to factual guilt, for example, making a constitutional challenge to the applicability of a statute to his conduct.

But in each such instance, the guidelines note that a determination that the defendant has accepted responsibility would be based primarily upon pretrial statements and conduct.

In the end, I think that it is important for me to recognize what he has done, the 50 hours of cooperation. But in the end, he doesn't get acceptance under the strict terms of the guidelines.

So the objection is overruled, but it doesn't mean that I don't take into account under 3553, and in the overall consideration of an appropriate sentence, those facts. And I don't know all of the facts relating to his -- the allegations that he lied on two issues in the District of Columbia.

I think, Mr. Downing, you invited the Court to go look at that. I declined that invitation. I am not -- I do not sit to second-guess Judge Jackson, and I'm not going to. She will do whatever she thinks is right, and I will accept that. I don't go behind it, and I don't need to know all of

-U.S. v. Manafort-39 1 that. 2 Now, I think I now have dealt with all of the 3 objections, Mr. Andres, Mr. Downing, Mr. Westling. MR. WESTLING: I think there is one additional 4 objection, Your Honor. 5 6 THE COURT: What's the additional one? 7 MR. WESTLING: Which related to the sophisticated means enhancement for the bank fraud. 8 9 THE COURT: Yes, yes. MR. WESTLING: We're happy to stand on our briefs, 10 11 but I just wanted to make --12 THE COURT: All right. Well, I'm happy to rule on the basis of the briefs that have been filed. I don't have 13 any doubt that this involves sophisticated means under the 14 15 guidelines, and so that enhancement is appropriate. 16 Now, I'm going to take a brief recess, and at the 17 end of that recess, I will either rule on this intended loss 18 issue or ask for more information, and then I will expect the 19 parties to be prepared to go on and make their arguments under 20 the sentencing arguments, with, Mr. Andres, you going first, 21 unless you're going to give Mr. Asonye an opportunity to 22 dazzle us with his verbal atomic footwork, and then you, Mr. 23 Westling. That's not meaningful to other people. 24 Mr. Asonye is an assistant U.S. attorney in the Eastern District, not a member of the Special Prosecutor's 25

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-U.S. v. Manafort—
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    office, and I see Mr. Asonye on a routine basis here on
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    Fridays and for trials. So I have some knowledge of his
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    verbal atomic footwork.
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              All right. We'll take a 15-minute recess and also
    take a -- we will then hear at -- once I hear argument from
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 6
    Mr. Manafort. I have the restitution order up here now? Yes.
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              All right. Court stands in recess.
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               (Recess.)
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               (Court proceedings resumed at 5:15 p.m.)
               (Defendant present.)
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              THE COURT: You-all can see why Mr. Flood got his
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    job. He can get your attention.
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              All right. I -- two things before we get to
    argument. First of all, there is this issue of the intended
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    loss on the Union Street property. The second -- or the first
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    loan didn't -- the first loan did not go through, but there's
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    still a $5.5 million loss on that one and that's what's at
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    issue, right?
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              MR. ANDRES: His second loan. So the first loan
20
    went through, in which Mr. Manafort hid the loan, the Genesis
21
    Capital loan. The -- when I say the first loan, I'm talking
22
    about the Count 24 and 25.
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              THE COURT: Just a moment.
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               (A pause in the proceedings.)
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              THE COURT: I'm sorry, Mr. Andres. Would you repeat
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-U.S. v. Manafort-

that, please?

MR. ANDRES: Yes. There were two loans with Citizens Bank. The first loan, which was charged in Count 24 and 25, was a loan for the Howard Street property, and on that property, Mr. Manafort hid his loan on the Union Street property.

The second loan was a loan that's charged in Count 28, is a loan for the Union Street property itself, and again, in that loan, Mr. Manafort hid the prior lien on that loan as well.

THE COURT: All right. And the issue that I raised was in the Union Street bank loan for 5.5 million, which never closed. Why should he be charged with \$5.5 million loss when it's difficult to understand that he intended a \$5.5 million loss? Now, usually the only loss that would occur on a loan that didn't close is -- well, no loss, but what he intended.

And I went and read, as you invited me to do, Mr.

Andres, paragraph 51 of the Statement of Offenses and other

acts in the District of Columbia, and it says that he made or

caused to be made a series of false and fraudulent material

representations to the bank in order to secure the loan,

including the submission of false statement of assets that hid

a prior loan on the Union Street property, that's the Genesis

loan, among other liabilities and the submission of falsified

2016 DMI, P&L that overstated DMI's income.

-U.S. v. Manafort-42 Do you have anything further you want to say on 1 2 this, Mr. Westling? I think I understand it. 3 MR. WESTLING: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: I'm going to overrule the objection, but 4 I'm going to state what I think is a real problem with it. 5 6 I find it difficult to see that as an intended loss 7 in that one. Sometimes there -- you could argue an 8 intended -- what they really wanted to do was get the interest rate down. That's why they left that -- whoever submitted it 10 left that loan out. But in any event, it isn't something that 11 is very material at all to my sentencing decision. 12 But I'm going to overrule the objection and I do 13 rely to some extent in that regard, Mr. Andres, on the 14 paragraph that you cited to me, paragraph 51 from the D.C. 15 submission. So now -- one other thing I wanted -- two things 16 I wanted to mention. 17 First of all is the restitution order. Mr. Asonye, 18 I don't think I agree with your construction of paragraph 3. 19 Paragraph 3 reads -- well, let me set the stage for people. 20 This is a restitution order, and the basic objection to the 21 restitution order is, to distill it to its essence, is the 22 defendant says, look, wait until these properties are all sold 23 and everything is all resolved, and then I'll know exactly 2.4 what I have to do in restitution. 25 That's a fairly appealing position to take.

-U.S. v. Manafort-43 Mr. Asonye says, well, we've taken care of that in paragraph 3 1 2 of the restitution order, and I don't think so, Mr. Asonye. 3 Let me tell you why. The amount of restitution paid 4 to any entity, I'm reading now from the restitution order, shall not exceed the entities in total loss from the offenses 5 of conviction pursuant to such-and-such statute. Any amount 6 7 paid to an entity under an order of restitution shall be 8 reduced by an amount later recovered as compensatory damages 9 for the same loss by the victim in any federal or state civil 10 proceeding. 11 Well, that's what you were referring to by saying 12 that it's -- that the order accommodates the defense's 13 argument that he shouldn't have to pay any more than an actual 14 loss, right? 15 MR. ASONYE: Both provisions, Your Honor. Both the first sentence, which permits that no --16 THE COURT: First sentence of paragraph 3. 17 18 MR. ASONYE: Correct, which --19 THE COURT: Look, just change -- why didn't you 20 change the language to say by an amount later recovered in any 21 way in the disposition of the property? Don't limit it to 22 compensatory damages for the same loss by the victim, but --23 MR. ASONYE: We have no objection to doing that, 24 Your Honor. That language comes straight from the statute. 25 THE COURT: I wouldn't think that -- well, just

-U.S. v. Manafort-44 because it comes straight from the statute doesn't mean it's 1 2 appropriate to accommodate the parties' intention on this -or the Court's intention on the restitution order. 3 4 I don't want to order restitution in any amount greater than what the disposition of this property gives to 5 these banks or other victims. 6 7 MR. ASONYE: So --8 THE COURT: Now, does that -- why don't you huddle 9 there with Mr. Westling and Mr. Downing, and let's see if we 10 can get language, because right now, I don't have a 11 restitution order signed by all parties, and that is something 12 I'd like to have before I proceed. 13 Now, while they're doing that, let me say this to the others. And, counsel, you don't need to listen to this, 14 15 so don't worry about it. 16 In a few minutes, I will be pronouncing sentence. 17 And although 99 percent of the cases I have in which I 18 announce sentences don't involve this kind of interest and 19 notoriety, the very few that I have had, minuscule number, as 20 soon as I say something, reporters run out. That's very 21 disruptive and not appropriate. I've never had it in a 22 sentencing. I've had it with jury verdicts and so forth, and 23 we don't want that to happen. If you want to do that, I would 24 ask that you retire to --

Mr. Flood, seven.

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-U.S. v. Manafort-45 1 THE CSO: Seven. 2 THE COURT: The seventh floor courtroom. Everything 3 is piped into there, and if you want to make immediate contact 4 with your publication, whatever it may be, when you hear 5 something, please use that. Let's not run out of here like 6 the beginning of a marathon or something because it's 7 disruptive and inappropriate. Thank you. 8 All right. Is that agreeable to you, Mr. Westling? 9 MR. WESTLING: Yes, Your Honor, that language in 10 that provision is agreeable. 11 THE COURT: All right. Well --12 MR. WESTLING: Let me just make a point on what 13 you're going to ask me next, Judge, is why haven't we signed 14 it. And I think just in terms of not waiving any possible 15 appellate right, I would prefer not to have the defendant sign 16 it but have the Court impose the order, because I don't want 17 to have been viewed as waiving any issue that I can't see down 18 the road. And so I recognize that may not be the local 19 practice, so I'll defer to the judge. But I just wanted to 20 make --21 THE COURT: All right. I don't know what you mean 22 by local practice. It's not what I typically do, but I will 23 do this because I think it's a fair restitution order and I 24 didn't like paragraph 3 the way it was. This one, I think, is

-Tonia M. Harris OCR-USDC/EDVA 703-646-1438-

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fine, Mr. Asonye.

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1	All right. Now, Mr well, who will argue for the
2	Government to begin with?
3	MR. ANDRES: Your Honor, I'm just going to cover the
4	3553 factors.
5	THE COURT: Yes.
6	MR. ANDRES: And Mr. Asonye has an outstanding issue
7	with respect to the forfeiture and with respect to fines. So
8	we'll split the argument up that way, and we're not going to
9	be long.
10	THE COURT: All right. Well, maybe I should hear
11	from him first though. What is it, forfeiture and what?
12	MR. ANDRES: And the fine.
13	MR. ASONYE: I think we'll start where we have the
14	most agreement, Your Honor, and on forfeiture.
15	In light of the forfeiture proceedings that are
16	taking place in the District of Columbia, and for ease of
17	administration and clarity, the parties have agreed that to
18	attempt to resolve the forfeiture issues pertaining to
19	Mr. Manafort in the District of Columbia; therefore, the
20	Government will not seek a forfeiture order in this district.
21	THE COURT: All right. Well, that's fine. Let
22	Judge Jackson deal with it. Next.
23	MR. ASONYE: The fine, Your Honor.
24	Now, the guidelines state that the Court shall
25	impose a fine in all cases except where the defendant

-U.S. v. Manafort-47 establishes he's unable to pay. And, Your Honor, the 1 2 defendant has not met his burden that he's unable to pay a substantial fine in this case, particularly since he has not 3 4 submitted the financial information requested by the probation officer. 5 We will note, however, that in paragraph 135 of the 6 7 PSR, it notes that based on the available financial 8 information to the probation officer, it appears he does have significant assets and that he does have the means to pay a 10 fine. And we'll note that Mr. Manafort -- the Government is 11 aware that Mr. Manafort owns two homes that are not included 12 in any forfeiture proceedings in D.C. He has a home in 13 Alexandria, Virginia, and he also has a home in Palm Beach 14 Gardens, Florida. 15 And the PSR notes that the equity in those homes is approximately \$4 million. So the Government certainly 16 17 believes that he has at least \$4 million to pay towards a fine 18 in this case, potentially more since he has not even submitted a financial information form, which is particularly troubling 19 20 in light of the fact that this prosecution is based on 21 Mr. Manafort hiding income and providing false statements to 22 financial institutions. 23 THE COURT: The restitution order says \$24 million.

MR. ASONYE: Yes, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: That includes the 6 million in unpaid

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    taxes?
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              MR. ASONYE: It does, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: All right. Go on.
              MR. ASONYE: That's it, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: All right. Mr. Westling or Mr. Downing.
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              MR. WESTLING: Your Honor, I think that from our
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    perspective, obviously it's in the Court's discretion to order
 8
    a fine. One of the factors you consider is whether he can pay
 9
    one. Clearly, even if you take the information from present
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11
              THE COURT: Why don't we have financial information?
12
              MR. WESTLING: I can only say, Your Honor, that it
13
    was a very difficult process given his incarceration. There's
14
    a lot of complexity to it, and we just had difficulty getting
15
    it together, and I apologize to the Court for that. I know it
16
    makes the job more difficult.
17
              But I will note that even based on this information,
18
    which we know includes the assets that are being forfeited in
19
    D.C., he has a net worth of 13 million. And the Court is
20
    going to enter an order of 24 million of restitution, and it
21
    seems to me it's clearly a situation where he's illiquid, and
22
    again, that includes assets that we know are being forfeited.
23
              THE COURT: Tell me this. This really should be
24
    directed to Mr. Asonye.
25
              Tell me this, Mr. Asonye: Will Judge Jackson also
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-U.S. v. Manafort-49 have the opportunity to impose a fine on the basis of 1 2 convictions or admitted conduct there? 3 MR. ASONYE: She would, Your Honor, but not on the admitted conduct here. 4 THE COURT: Why? He's admitted all the conduct over 5 6 there. 7 MR. ASONYE: Yeah, but it's not relevant conduct for 8 purposes of calculating the guidelines in the District of 9 Columbia. It's just essentially relevant conduct for purposes 10 of considering the 3553 --11 THE COURT: Can you tell me what defined guidelines 12 are in the District of Columbia? 13 MR. ASONYE: One -- Court's indulgence? 14 THE COURT: Yes, of course. 15 (A pause in the proceedings.) 16 MR. ASONYE: Your Honor, there is a -- there is a 17 PSR in the District of Columbia. It does note a fine range, 18 but the Government will object because we don't believe it was 19 calculated correctly. So in our view, we do not currently 20 know an accurate fine range for the District of Columbia. But 21 I will note it does not include --22 THE COURT: What's your view of the correct fine 23 guideline range in the District of Columbia? That is, what's 2.4 the Government's view? You may confer with your co-counsel. 25 (A pause in the proceedings.)

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              MR. ASONYE: Your Honor, the PSR in the District of
 2
    Columbia says that the maximum fine range is $250,000 times
 3
    two for the two counts, so --
 4
              THE COURT: Yes, but I -- that's the PSR.
              MR. ASONYE: Right.
 5
              THE COURT: You said you differ.
 6
 7
              MR. ASONYE: Correct.
 8
              THE COURT: I want to know what you think.
 9
              MR. ASONYE: And our view is that the maximum fine
10
    range in D.C. should be approximately $12 million.
11
              THE COURT: Well, tell me again, Mr. Asonye, what we
12
    know or what the Government knows right now of his financial
    situation.
13
              MR. ASONYE: We know that he owns two homes with net
14
15
    equity of approximately $4 million. That's in paragraph, I
16
    believe, 135 of the PSR. 132, Your Honor.
              The Palm Beach, Florida, home has an equity,
17
    according to the PSR, of $1.25 million, and the Alexandria
18
19
    home has equity of approximately $3 million.
20
              THE COURT: The reason --
21
              MR. ASONYE: And, Your Honor, if -- I will also
22
    add --
23
              THE COURT: Just a moment. The reason that I want
24
    to know that is the primary financial burden on the defendant
25
    should be restitution, not a fine. And it makes no sense to
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impose an onerous fine when restitution is already significant. The purpose of a fine is chiefly punitive and I don't know that we need that if we're going to have a restitution of \$24 million.

THE COURT: Because I think the Government would agree that victims should be paid before the Government gets its fine money, right?

MR. ASONYE: And, Your Honor, to that point --

MR. ASONYE: We do agree with that, Your Honor. I would note that although the forfeiture proceedings are ongoing in the District of Columbia, and I hesitate to say how things will turn out, because we still are negotiating with Mr. Manafort and the various banks.

If things go according to plan, we have some sense, if you look at paragraph 64 of the PSR, of where -- how much the banks will receive based on estimates of the value. And so if you look at the Citizens Bank loan, the \$3.2 million, the estimate fair market value of that property, as estimated in the PSR, is \$3.8 million. So if things go according to plan, Citizens Bank may be made whole.

Banc of California, there was no collateral, so we are looking at a \$685,000 loss at least there. And then with respect to the Federal Savings Bank, again, the PSR has calculated at approximately, after the collateral, if it's disposed appropriately in the District of Columbia,

Case 1:17-cr-00201-ABJ Document 544 Filed 03/11/19 Page 54 of 99 -U.S. v. Manafort— 52 1 approximately \$200,000 loss. 2 So in truth, if the -- if things go as we project, 3 then actually the banks will be out -- Mr. Manafort will still 4 owe \$1 million on a restitution order after the properties are forfeited and paid. So he still would have -- that's actually 5 6 a restitution amount that he should be able to pay, 7 particularly in light of the fact that he has \$4 million in 8 equity in his homes. That doesn't include the additional 9 securities that are listed in the PSR of approximately 10 \$5.6 million, which is listed in paragraph 131. 11 THE COURT: But he also has a \$6 million bill to pay 12 to the IRS. 13 MR. ASONYE: That's true. The fine, though -- and, 14 Your Honor, the fine and the tax obligation as such, they're 15 all to Uncle Sam. 16 THE COURT: Oh, no. The fine is. The tax is paying 17 back you, me, and the rest of the folks here who paid their 18 taxes. 19 MR. ASONYE: That's true, Your Honor. 20 THE COURT: As I will tell Mr. Manafort, the real

THE COURT: As I will tell Mr. Manafort, the real essence of his violation is he stole from us, from people who paid their taxes, not the fine. The fine is punitive, pure and simple.

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MR. ASONYE: Your Honor, I agree. And at bottom, the guidelines instruct that if Mr. Manafort has an ability to

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-U.S. v. Manafort—
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    pay a fine, the Court shall impose one. And clearly if --
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 2
              THE COURT: Well, that's -- is that the guideline or
 3
    the statute?
              MR. ASONYE: Well, that's -- I'm reading from the
 4
 5
    quidelines. But the statute --
 6
              THE COURT: All right. It's what it says, "shall."
 7
    It's not a command that I have to follow. The guidelines are
 8
    not mandatory.
 9
              MR. ASONYE: It's 3572, Your Honor, 18 U.S.C. 3572.
              THE COURT: All right. It's a statute, not the
10
11
    quidelines.
12
              MR. ASONYE: Correct. And the Court should impose a
13
    fine if Mr. Manafort has ability to pay one. The Government's
    argument is that he certainly has multiple millions of dollars
14
15
    after the restitution order to pay a fine.
              THE COURT: All right. Mr. Westling.
16
17
              MR. WESTLING: Well, I think, Your Honor, that we
18
    would contend that even with Mr. --
19
              THE COURT: A little louder, please, sir.
20
              MR. WESTLING: I'm sorry?
              THE COURT: A little louder.
21
22
              MR. WESTLING: I've actually been reminded by
23
    Ms. Harris a couple of times, Judge.
24
              THE COURT: Well, I know, but I -- we always require
    lawyers to come to the podium, but it's a big -- it's a lot of
25
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lawyers today, and I want to get things done.

MR. WESTLING: Understood, Your Honor. What we would simply note, Your Honor, is that even assuming that Mr. Asonye's math about the repayment to the various lenders is correct, which we would probably bicker with, you still have a \$7 million restitution order against assets, which the Government says amount to two homes worth about \$4 million.

So I recognize that, you know, we're dealing with a lot of issues here, but I think there's still a big "if" about what will be collected from the sale of those properties. And it -- in any case, he faces a restitution order of \$20 million -- \$24 million on its face. So we can't really know whether that is what he'll have to pay or not until the sales take place. I think based on all of that, we would simply say there's not evidence he has the ability to pay.

THE COURT: I wonder if the restitution order shouldn't say that the defendant is ordered to pay restitution in an amount of at least -- no, not at least -- in an amount of up to \$24 million. It may be less; am I right?

MR. ASONYE: That's -- the Government has no objection to that. You are correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, let's change the language there.

I'm still -- Mr. Asonye, I'm still puzzled a bit by imposing a fine when I don't know what the total amount of restitution is going to be in the end and how that will affect his ability to

-U.S. v. Manafort— 55 pay. I think your -- the argument you've made is that the 1 2 predictions on the dispositions of the property and the restitution to the other victims is such that even after all 3 4 that's paid, plus the \$6 million in tax liability, would leave him with two homes. Is that your view? 5 6 MR. ASONYE: Two homes and millions of dollars in 7 securities, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: And they're in what paragraph? 9 MR. ASONYE: 131 of the PSR. And again, Your Honor, that's based on information that the probation officer was 10 11 able to locate. The securities are listed at the bottom of 12 page 44 of the PSR: a \$4.2 million in securities, a life 13 insurance policy of \$1.496 million and another \$2.5 million in 14 investments in a --15 THE COURT: He has to die to get that 1.496. 16 MR. ASONYE: Your Honor, I believe there are ways to 17 cash out and to sell your life insurance policies. 18 THE COURT: There are, indeed, but -- there are, 19 indeed, but certainly not for \$1.496 million. 20 MR. ASONYE: But, Your Honor --21 THE COURT: Have you ever tried to sell an insurance 22 policy that you have? 23 MR. ASONYE: I have not. 24 THE COURT: Don't do it. You will be dismayed. 25 MR. ASONYE: The point is, Your Honor, it's the

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-U.S. v. Manafort-
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    defendant's burden to prove he doesn't have the ability to pay
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 2
    a fine, and he hasn't --
 3
              THE COURT: Right. I understand that. But I am not
 4
    going to impose a fine that is unfair.
 5
              MR. ASONYE: And --
 6
              THE COURT: If I don't -- let me ask you this: If I
 7
    don't have enough information, can I -- I know I can delay
 8
    restitution, but I don't need to because of some changes have
    been made. But can I also delay the imposition of fine? I
10
    don't think the law permits that.
11
              MR. ASONYE: And we don't believe it does,
12
    Your Honor. And what we would submit is, you do have -- you
13
    do have before you in the PSR information of -- about the
14
    equity and properties that he owns and securities of at least
    $4 million.
15
16
              THE COURT: What do you think a fine should be?
17
              MR. ASONYE: Well, Your Honor, what we've -- the
    position of the Special Counsel is that we do not make --
18
19
              THE COURT: That's the Government's position. I
20
    don't want to hear Special Counsel, the Government.
21
              MR. ASONYE: The Government's position is that we
22
    out -- lay out the fine range, which is laid here. But we're
    not taking a specific position on the exact fine that the
23
    Court should.
2.4
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              THE COURT: So what's the fine range again?
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-U.S. v. Manafort—
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              MR. ASONYE: Your Honor, the fine range in this case
 2
    is on page 49 of the PSR, $50,000 to 25 -- essentially just
 3
    over $25 million, Your Honor.
              THE COURT: So that's a pretty good range and you
 4
 5
    don't take a position. Stand by.
 6
              All right. Thank you.
 7
              Do you have anything else, Mr. Westling?
              MR. WESTLING: No, Your Honor.
 8
 9
              THE COURT: All right. Now, we've come to the
    sentence, itself.
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              Mr. Andres.
11
12
              MR. ANDRES: Thank you, Your Honor. I'll be brief.
13
              Your Honor, I'm going to focus my comments obviously
    on the 3553 factors. I wanted to start, though, with the
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15
    cooperation. The Special Counsel's office takes the position
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    that Mr. Manafort did not provide sufficient cooperation to
17
    allow for any mitigation by this Court. I know that the
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    counsel has noted that there were 50 hours of cooperation, but
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    the --
20
              THE COURT: Is that inaccurate?
              MR. ANDRES: It was long. I would say -- I don't
21
22
    know.
23
              MR. DOWNING: It was.
24
              MR. ANDRES: If it was 50 hours, but we met on
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    multiple occasions, I think on at least ten occasions. So the
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-U.S. v. Manafort-58 number of hours is probably in the ballpark, but it's not 1 2 reflective, Your Honor, of the value of the information that Mr. --3 4 THE COURT: Well, of course not. You haven't filed a 5K1.1. So in your view, I knew that the Government didn't 5 consider his cooperation to be substantial, but that doesn't 6 7 mean that he didn't cooperate. That doesn't mean that he didn't give you a lot of information. It just means he didn't 8 9 give you information you thought was particularly valuable. 10 MR. ANDRES: I disagree, Your Honor. Defense 11 counsel who bears the burden here hasn't provided, Your Honor, 12 with a single --13 THE COURT: Bears the burden of what? 14 MR. ANDRES: To establish what the cooperation was, 15 and they haven't provided --16 THE COURT: I haven't given them a 5K1.1. They aren't going to get one and they aren't going to get 17 acceptance of responsibility. And you've admitted he spent 18 19 about 50 hours. Now, you say under 3553, I shouldn't take 20 that into account in imposing a sentence because you don't think -- well, two things. You say, one, he lied, and two, 21 22 the information he provided, you didn't like it. It wasn't of 23 substantial assistance. I understand that. 24 MR. ANDRES: And three -- and three or four, even 25 Mr. Manafort hasn't provided the Court with any information

-U.S. v. Manafort-59 1 that he provided to the Special Counsel that was of any value. 2 So what Your Honor is evaluating is simply the fact 3 that he met for 50 hours. And the reason that he met for 4 50 hours was because he lied. Because he lied, it took longer to try to show Mr. Manafort what the evidence was to allow him 5 to provide truthful proffers. It certainly was the -- was in 6 the interest of the Special Counsel's office to have 7 Mr. Manafort provide helpful and meaningful cooperation and he 8 didn't. 10 There were a wide range of issues that he was asked 11 about and he did not provide valuable cooperation. And 12 there's nothing in the record, Your Honor, to suggest that he 13 did. Mr. Downing has simply cited the number of hours, but not anything specific about any individual, about any area of 14 15 cooperation or anything that merits Your Honor --16 THE COURT: So I'm to assume that he spent 50 hours 17 telling you things you didn't want to hear. 18 MR. ANDRES: He told us 50 hours, a large part of 19 things we already knew or was included in documents. 20 THE COURT: All right. 21 MR. ANDRES: So he didn't provide additional 22 information. It wasn't 50 hours of information that we didn't 23

know and it certainly wasn't 50 hours of information that was useful.

THE COURT: All right. Go on.

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-U.S. v. Manafort-

MR. ANDRES: Your Honor, the 3553 factors obviously first begin with the nature and circumstances of the offenses. The jury in this courtroom convicted Mr. Manafort of serious crimes, crimes that were serious because of their frequency, crimes that were serious because of the amount of money involved. Millions of dollars in unpaid taxes and millions of dollars secured by fraud from financial institutions. They were serious crimes because they were sophisticated schemes, because they involved a number of individuals.

Mr. Manafort's crimes did not occur decades ago, not even a decade ago. He made criminal choices as recently as 2016 and 2017. No one made up those crimes. Nobody conjured them up. Mr. Manafort, himself, made criminal choices and those choices have consequences. The crimes were borne out in the dozens and hundreds of documents admitted as evidence in this trial -- at the trial, in bank account records, corporate documents, loan files, tax returns and the more than dozen witnesses.

Mr. Manafort made criminal choices and the jury of his peers found him guilty. Bank records established that Mr. Manafort had more than 30 foreign overseas bank accounts in three different countries. They involved a dozen different shelf companies, which existed only to receive and hide those funds. Those accounts held more than \$55 million.

Mr. Manafort failed to pay more than \$6 million in taxes and

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he broke the basic civil covenant of citizens in this democracy, the agreement to pay taxes. And again, that was his choice and those choices have consequences.

And today, we know that Mr. Manafort remains -fails to accept responsibility and is not remorseful. We hear
that he's failed to file a financial statement. As of today,
we really have no idea of what his financials are, financial
assets are, particularly in a case where he was convicted of
hiding his assets and in a case where he's doctored financial
statements and submitted them to the bank. The Government
submits that that suggests a lack of remorse for his crimes.

As I mentioned, he secured more than \$25 million in bank loans. Mr. Manafort has cited to a series of different offshore tax cases and those cases are nothing like the case before Your Honor. This is a case about tax fraud, FBAR fraud and bank fraud cases. Mr. Manafort didn't simply --

THE COURT: Actually I resided over some of those and they are like this. Every FBAR case involves trying to hide money and usually the government gets a plea and they don't go through all the tax returns and everything else. So I don't think it's accurate to say that those cases are nothing like this case. There are always differences, case to case. But there is a lot of similarity between those cases and this.

MR. ANDRES: Your Honor, if I may, the Horsky case,

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-U.S. v. Manafort-
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 1
    which Your Honor presided over --
 2
              THE COURT: Yes.
 3
              MR. ANDRES: -- was significantly different. In
 4
    that case, the defendant had an investment scheme and he hid
 5
    the money from that investment. He didn't use the account --
 6
              THE COURT: Now, how many -- how much taxes did he
 7
    avoid paying?
              MR. ANDRES: I believe that his --
 8
 9
              THE COURT: It was three times what he avoided
    paying, three times.
10
11
              MR. ANDRES: Right. And how --
12
              THE COURT: And -- but a big difference that you
13
    ought to point out Mr. Horsky -- refresh my recollection here,
14
    those who might have been here -- he showed up at sentencing
15
    with a check. He paid everything.
16
              MR. ANDRES: $100 million, Your Honor.
17
              THE COURT: Well, he owed a lot.
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              MR. ANDRES: He did, he did. But before his
19
    sentencing, Your --
20
              THE COURT: But he was able to pay everything.
21
              MR. ANDRES: I understand.
22
              THE COURT: So that is a difference between that
23
    case and this case. But basically any FBAR case is a case of
24
    stealing money from the U.S. It's the same as any tax fraud
25
    case. That's why people don't report foreign bank accounts.
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-U.S. v. Manafort-63 They want to hide income. So they are similar cases. 1 2 take your point and it's a valid point that there are differences between Horsky and Manafort. Whether they're as 3 large as you think they are, is a matter I have to consider. 4 MR. ANDRES: Understood. And I haven't said exactly 5 how large those differences are. But consider this, 6 7 There are other cases where the -- there are Your Honor. 8 other defendants where the cases that are cited by Mr. Manafort, defendants self disclosed their activity. 10 People got downward departures for cooperation. People got 11 reductions for acceptance of responsibility. One defendant 12 was an 80-year-old woman in Florida who inherited money when her husband died who he -- and he, himself, had inherited that 13 14 money in an overseas foreign account. They didn't use the 15 accounts in the way that Mr. Manafort did and they didn't have 16 the knowledge Mr. Manafort did. 17 One other important distinction, Your Honor. 18 Mr. Manafort didn't only use his overseas accounts for the 19 purposes of hiding taxes. He also used it for the promotion 20 of his FERA violation and his FERA crimes in the District of 21 Columbia, and that was part of his plea in the District of 22 Columbia that the -- some of the --23 THE COURT: For which he will be punished there.

MR. ANDRES: Understood. But it's also a point of distinction with respect to the FERA crimes -- the FBAR crimes

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-U.S. v. Manafort-64 here. I'm not suggesting -- I'm just suggesting that not all 1 2 FBAR cases are the same. Certainly the list --3 THE COURT: Most of them are pretty close. 4 MR. ANDRES: Well, again, I would disagree, Your Honor, but --5 6 THE COURT: Well, let me put it to you this way. 7 Most of the ones I've presided over and studied are pretty 8 much the same. They're hiding money from the U.S. government 9 so they don't have to pay taxes on it. 10 MR. ANDRES: Understood. And obviously there are 11 disparities with all of them as to the amount, as to whether 12 they got downward departures, as to whether --13 THE COURT: Some made contributions to charitable institutions, some did all kinds of good things. Well, 14 15 Mr. Manafort has done some, as the defense has pointed out in their brief. Some people were just, otherwise, pretty bad. 16 Others did lots of redemptive things that redeemed them. 17 18 All -- every case is different, every defendant is different. But the fundamental conduct of FBAR violations and 19 20 tax evasion is all the same. Hide money from the government 21 so you don't have to pay taxes on it. 22 MR. ANDRES: Your Honor, I'd also like to address 23 the issue of deterrence here as required by 3553, both general 24 deterrence and specific deterrence are important. The law 25 requires the Court to impose a sentence that shows others that

-U.S. v. Manafort-65 this conduct has consequences, that Mr. Manafort's criminal 1 2 choices have consequences. And obviously the sentence must stand as a beacon to others that this conduct can't be 3 4 accepted. In this case, there's --THE COURT: I think you've heard me before. 5 6 MR. ANDRES: I've read you, Judge. 7 The -- there's also a need for specific deterrence 8 with respect to Mr. Manafort. He committed crimes over an 9 extended period of time. In the Government's view, he has not 10 accepted responsibility. His sentencing submissions are 11 replete with blaming others for his consequences and not 12 taking responsibility, and Mr. Manafort is here today because of the criminal decisions he made himself. 13 14 With that, Your Honor, the Government asks that the 15 Court impose a substantial sentence consistent with those 3553 16 factors and those we've discussed in our submission. Thank 17 you. 18 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Downing or Mr. Westling. 19 MR. DOWNING: We're going to have Mr. Zehnle now. 20 THE COURT: All right. 21 MR. DOWNING: Thank you, Your Honor. 22 MR. ZEHNLE: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Zehnle. 24 MR. ZEHNLE: Your Honor, in terms of the focus of 25 the 3553 factors, I want to devote primarily the time to the

-U.S. v. Manafort-66 sentencing disparity issue that Mr. Andres was just hitting on 1 2 last. Essentially, the cases that the defense has cited in its filings versus what the Government has done with respect 3 4 to that, I think it's telling because if you look at the 5 numerous cases, not only with Your Honor, not only with other judges in this district court, but judges across the country, 6 we've cited more than 20 different cases. 7 8 THE COURT: Excuse me a minute. 9 (A pause in the proceedings.) 10 THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Zehnle. 11 MR. ZEHNLE: Yes, Your Honor. What I was saying was that we have cited more than 20 different cases in our 12 13 pleadings as the Court is aware. And as the Court just 14 recognized, these are cases that involve both tax and FBAR 15 charges. 16 Now, the Government seeks to distinguish this 17 particular case from all those other cases involving tax 18 charges and FBAR charges when this Court sat and heard the 19 same evidence that everyone else did, that the FBAR charge, 20 the one that he was convicted on in this court, was covered by 21 the tax charge in Count 3. 22 The false tax return was not only unreported income, 23 but also the failure to report the tax -- the foreign bank

The false tax return was not only unreported income but also the failure to report the tax -- the foreign bank accounts. All that evidence, all that -- all those charges are relevant, Your Honor. They're all tax and tax related.

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-U.S. v. Manafort-

And the Government seeks to then say, well, there's also this bank fraud stuff out there, and that's what makes this different.

But I would point the Court to something that the Government said in its opening statement in this case that ties this entire matter together as a tax and tax related case. Mr. Asonye was stating, and I quote, this is on page 24 of the transcript, "In 2015, the defendant's work in Ukraine had dried up. He was no longer making millions and couldn't support his lifestyle. Mr. Manafort was running out of cash and to maintain that life he had become accustomed to, he needed more of it. So he approached multiple banks for loans, loans on homes that he purchased and improved with the untaxed income from his foreign banks."

Your Honor, that's their words, not mine. They're the ones who have tied this all into one theme of Mr. Manafort has made a lot of money being an advisor overseas. He did not report that money. That money was kept in foreign bank accounts and that is the crux of this case. And as this Court just pointed out, the -- all of those cases that we cited in this district, California, Illinois, Wisconsin, New York, New Jersey, all those cases all involve similar circumstances of tax avoidance, tax evasion, failing to file tax returns and FBARs. And the two charges related to the bank fraud specifically tie into that because, in closing, the Government

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also refers back to, well, gee, when things got tight, he basically tapped into money by getting mortgages on assets that he had used untaxed proceeds to purchase. So it all ties together, Your Honor.

And it wasn't a smattering. I mean, if you look at the Government's filing, they basically put one paragraph on it, which is telling in and of itself on that particular sentencing factor. And then, you know, they actually filed a reply and they still didn't really deal with it.

So I also wanted to make note of one other point just with respect to the sentencing disparity issues. I think Mr. Andres was talking about, well, some of these dealt with pleas. Well, yes, Your Honor, some of them did deal with pleas. The majority deal with pleas. This Court's well aware that most cases plead. It's rare that cases go to trial anymore. But we did find and present to this Court cases where the defendant had actually gone to trial, and that person, for example, in one of the cases we cite, Ashvin Desai was convicted of hiding over 8 million. And the guidelines range for him was 78 to 96 months and he was sentenced to six months in prison and six months of home detention.

There's another one, Arvind Ahuja. That was more than 8.5 million, Your Honor. The sentencing guidelines in that case were 41 to 51. He was sentenced to three years of probation and three months in home confinement. For the ones

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for which there were pleas or there were pleas and cooperation, the majority of them are probation.

So I don't think it's fair for the Government to sit there and try to distinguish away cases that involve taxes and FBAR combined by saying, oh, gee, this is so different from those. It's not, Your Honor, as the Court correctly noted.

Now, turning briefly to some of the other points that Mr. Andres made, serious crimes. Of course, this -- you're -- you know, Mr. Manafort is going to speak to you in a moment. These are serious crimes. We understand that. No one is disputing that. Your Honor, for 14 years, I was sitting at that table as a federal prosecutor and as a chief of one of the criminal sections.

THE COURT: And you're trying to redeem yourself now.

MR. ZEHNLE: But I do -- Your Honor, I do have, I think, a good deal of familiarity with tax cases and FBAR cases and those kinds of things. And these charges that were brought in this case that were tried before Your Honor are quite similar, and they're serious, but they're very similar to these other cases that we've actually directed you to.

In terms of -- it was interesting that the Government did point out the Professor Horsky case that I know this Court handled. Yes, he did show up with a check and he did -- it was \$100 million, Your Honor.

charges were --

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One point I would like to make for the Court's consideration, though, is Mr. Manafort and his team have been working through forfeiture issues for many months now as part of our negotiated plea with them. And it's difficult to sit there and say, well, gee, you haven't paid back the IRS yet when you're still trying to sit there and give the Government, you know, the property that you've agreed to forfeit.

It's not like the IRS is going to go away. I mean, a lot of people would probably like that to happen, but it's not going to happen. And so I just wanted to make that point, that that's a little unfair to basically say, well, gee, you know, you didn't show up, you know, you haven't made any payments, et cetera, because he is working through his agreement despite the Government's breach determination that they've made based -- unilaterally on their good faith, they've made that determination, we still continue to do that.

MR. ZEHNLE: Oh, yeah. Your Honor, yeah, and as I was talking to Mr. Downing, in terms of the deterrence issue, this case, as you've pointed out, has probably gotten more scrutiny than any other tax FBAR violation case I've ever seen. And whether it's because of the nature of how the

(A pause in the proceedings.)

THE COURT: Well, we know why. Come on. It's not relevant to my determination of an appropriate sentence. But

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we all know why there's this much interest.

MR. ZEHNLE: So let -- so if I may be just a little more clear. I understand, Your Honor. I'm just saying that in terms of general deterrence, one of the things you always focus on, if you're the Government or prosecutor, is getting the word out and letting people know, look, this is a serious crime.

THE COURT: You're quite right. We don't have to worry about that in this case. That's why I told that story about -- even then, though, this -- it's not clear because when I put -- had them -- the Government put up all those signs, it didn't make any difference. Mules continued to come. Maybe they didn't read the signs.

Deterrence is endlessly to debated by academics based on empirical studies. It's a hard, hard issue. But Congress has decided that I have to take it into account and I do. Mr. Andres has appropriately argued about special or specific deterrence and general deterrence. Both are important factors for the Court to consider. And you're pointing out that there will be general deterrence here because of the notoriety provided to this case.

MR. ZEHNLE: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Go on. I don't know how that counts for you. Mr. Evans, I think, would point out the same thing. He would say, you know, give him a life sentence

-U.S. v. Manafort-72 so -- and we'll publish that. Actually the guidelines are 1 2 pretty high. 3 MR. ZEHNLE: Yes, Your Honor. The guidelines are 4 extraordinarily high. THE COURT: 19 to 24 years. I believe that's right, 5 19 to 24. It's about right, isn't it? 6 7 MR. ZEHNLE: It was 19 and a half to 24 years, Your Honor. 8 9 THE COURT: Yes, go on. MR. ZEHNLE: Okay. If -- and since I did reference 10 11 it a moment ago, Your Honor, as I did sit at that table for 12 many years, I can tell you because -- I don't want to repeat 13 myself from what we've put in the papers, but I can tell you that when I was a chief, I would tell my younger prosecutors 14 15 in tax cases in particular, you know, if you received a 16 sentence of 18 months to 24 months of imprisonment in a tax 17 case, that's pretty good, because in terms of the gradation of 18 all the federal offenses, you know, under Title 26, under 19 Title 18, it's just an understanding that courts every day --20 you know, tax evasion is by no means jaywalking. But it is 21 also not, you know, narcotics trafficking where people, you 22 know, have their lives ruined and people get killed in the 23 trade. 24 And so you have to understand the courts are taking 25 all these things into account, and that's why I make that

-U.S. v. Manafort-73 statement when I was a chief of those sections. Here, instead 1 2 of 18 to 24 months, the guidelines are showing 18 to 24 years. It's just so disproportionate. 3 THE COURT: 19 to 24. 4 5 MR. ZEHNLE: 19.5 to be actual -- to be correct, 19.5 to 24 years, Your Honor. 6 7 And so the only other two things I want to make a 8 point of, because I do think the Court should be aware of it, 9 the 50 hours plus that my client spent with the Government, we 10 would have no problem -- and the Government, you know, if they 11 want to provide you all the 302's to see the cooperation that 12 he provided, we don't have the 302's --13 THE COURT: I'm not interested in reading that. MR. ZEHNLE: I understand, Your Honor. But I'm just 14 15 saying it's like, oh, well, they haven't proven it --THE COURT: Now, there are people here who would be 16 17 interested. But I'm not one of them. 18 MR. ZEHNLE: And the last thing I do want to point 19 out, Your Honor, because it did come out at trial and it came 20 up through their main cooperating witness, is that back in 21 2014, and the Court may recall that there was a meeting 22 between FBI agents and Mr. Manafort and Mr. Gates, and a 23 number of these entities and accounts were disclosed at that 24 time. And so I just think that these are important facts as 25 the Court considers, you know, all the 3553 factors, that it

-U.S. v. Manafort-74 1 also pay specific attention to those. 2 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Manafort, this is now 3 your opportunity to address the Court and to say anything --4 and you may remain seated. 5 MR. MANAFORT: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: But speak up, please. And the reason 6 7 you may remain seated is because I understand that you have a 8 physical impairment at the moment that makes that very painful. This is your opportunity to address the Court and to 10 say anything at all you wish to the Court by way of 11 extenuation, mitigation or, indeed, anything you think I 12 should know before sentence is imposed. You're not required 13 to say anything, but you have the opportunity to do so if you 14 wish to. Do you wish to say anything? 15 THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, Your Honor. Yes, I would. 16 THE COURT: All right. Please keep your voice up, 17 18 sir. 19 THE DEFENDANT: The last two years, Your Honor, have 20 been the most difficult years for my family and I that we've 21 ever experienced. 22 THE COURT: I'm sorry. I'm an old man with bad 23 ears, so you're going to have to speak up a little louder than 24 that. 25 Do you have a microphone there for Mr. Manafort?

-U.S. v. Manafort-75 THE DEFENDANT: I'll speak more loudly. 1 2 THE COURT: All right. Go ahead, sir. 3 THE DEFENDANT: The last two years have been the 4 most difficult that my family and I have ever experienced. The person that I am or that I have been described as in 5 public is not someone I recognize. To say that I feel 6 7 humiliated and ashamed would be a gross understatement of this characterization. 8 9 But the worse pain that I feel is the pain that I know my family is feeling. My whole life I have been proud --10 11 I've been most proud of being the protector and their role 12 model, and it pains me deeply that I have caused them this 13 suffering by the actions that have happened confront me here 14 today. 15 What has been uplifting to me, I should say, however, is the outpouring of support and affection that I 16 17 have received not just from my family and friends but from 18 total strangers. The support and the incredible power of 19 their prayers is what has sustained me through these terrible 20 times. 21 Having been separated from my family over the last 22 nine years -- nine months has been very hard. At a time when 23 I planned to be spending quality time giving back to my

family, I've had to rely upon them as my -- for support to get me through this situation. I truly feel the bonds of their

24

25

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love and have been strengthened by it.

In the midst of this pain, I must tell you, Your
Honor, that I appreciate the fairness of the trial that you
have conducted. I know this has not been easy given the media
frenzy atmosphere surrounding the trial. I know how it
affects me, and I know the kind of pressures it put on the
Court, and I truly do appreciate the fact that at least from
my perspective, I feel that you've bent over backwards to make
this to be a fair proceeding.

I could tell you that I feel the punishment from these proceedings already and know that it was my conduct that brought me here. Nine months of solitary confinement after seven months of home arrest have given me -- has affected my physical and mental health. My life professionally and financially is in shambles, and I feel the pain and shame of these factors.

I say all of this to let the Court know that I will never put myself in questionable circumstances in the future. Sitting in solitary confinement, I've had much time to reflect upon my life and my choices and the importance of family and friends. This reflection has created my intent to turn my notoriety into a positive and show the world who I know I really am and who is not who I've been depicted to be.

With the power of prayer and God's guiding hand, I know that my family and I will grow stronger from this ordeal,

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    and I recognize and acknowledge that it is an ordeal that I am
 1
 2
    responsible for.
 3
              Again, I want to thank you for the fair trial.
 4
    wisdom and management of this courtroom has given me hope for
 5
    the judicial system, and I am ready for your decision, and I
 6
    ask your compassion.
 7
              THE COURT: All right. Anything further?
 8
               (No response.)
 9
              THE COURT: All right. I'll take a brief recess and
10
    then pronounce sentence. Court stands in recess. It will be
11
    ten minutes.
12
               (Recess.)
13
               (Court proceedings resumed at 6:32 p.m.)
14
              THE COURT: All right. Any reason why the Court
15
    should not now pronounce sentence, Mr. Andres?
16
              MR. ANDRES: No, Your Honor.
17
              THE COURT: Mr. Downing?
18
              MR. DOWNING: No, Your Honor.
19
              THE COURT: Mr. Manafort, you may remain seated.
20
              Mr. Manafort, you stand convicted of the serious
21
    crimes -- very serious crimes by a jury. You stand convicted
22
    of five counts of failing to report. Each of those counts
23
    carries a maximum term of imprisonment of three years.
24
              You stand convicted of one count of failing to file
25
    a report of a foreign bank account that has a ten-year
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maximum, I believe -- five-year maximum, and then you stand convicted of two bank fraud -- excuse me -- two bank fraud counts, and each of those carries a maximum term of imprisonment of 30 years.

The law requires that I consider a variety of factors in imposing an appropriate sentence. First, the nature and circumstances of the offense. And as the government has argued and, I think, the defendant accepts or concedes, they are serious crimes. They are very serious crimes.

The essence of the tax fraud or failure to report counts and FBAR counts is hiding money from the government so that you don't have to pay taxes on it. And in this case, the amount of money hidden resulted in a tax loss to the government of 6 plus -- 6 and -- I've forgotten what the exact figure was, 6.3 -- or something of that sort -- million dollars. And as I said earlier, in essence, that's a theft of money, a theft of money from everyone who pays their taxes. If you don't pay your fair share, you're taking away from the common pool of money that the government uses. So those counts were appropriately grouped for tax -- or for guidelines calculations.

So the nature and circumstances of the offense, I think, are clear, and they're undeniably serious, as

Mr. Andres argued. They are serious offenses, and I don't

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think that the defense argues otherwise.

Next, the Court must take into account the history and characteristics of the defendant. The defendant is a Category I in criminal history; that is, he has no criminal history. He is a graduate of a university and law school here, Georgetown for both, and he's lived an otherwise blameless life. And he's also earned the admiration of a number of people, all of whom have written the Court about him.

And you've received those letters as well,

Mr. Andres, I'm sure.

MR. ANDRES: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And I have reviewed those, and I have taken those into account. And the law is very clear that in sentencing, a court must consider the entire individual, not just the individual and his crime-committing activities.

Mr. Manafort has engaged in lots of good things.

He's been a good father and husband, and he has been a good

friend to others and a generous person. Of course, that can't

erase his criminal activity, but it is -- they are factors

that the Court must take into account.

Next, the Court has to impose a sentence that reflects the seriousness of these offenses and a sentence that promotes respect for the law and that provides just punishment for the offenses.

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And the Court must impose a sentence that promotes -- or that provides adequate deterrence for the defendant specifically and general deterrence as well. And

I'll discuss that in a little greater detail.

The Court also has to take account of the guidelines. They're not mandatory, but they're advisory.

These guidelines are quite high. They provide for a sentence that is from 19 to 24 years, roughly.

I think that sentencing range is excessive. I don't think that's warranted in this case. It raises questions.

The guidelines are important because they -- I began sentencing people before there were guidelines, and the variety of sentences that could be imposed was staggering. It mattered a lot whether you got Judge A or Judge B. You could go home to probation or to jail for ten years depending on whether it was Judge A or Judge B, and that was really not right, and I think we all knew it wasn't right, and I personally was glad when the guidelines came into effect.

But as I lived under the guidelines initially and they were mandatory, I came to conclude that they were not a good idea as they stood, and ultimately, that changed.

And we should all remember who brought that about.

It was Justice Scalia in his opinions, which was a surprise to some, I suppose. Anyway, they're now not mandatory; they're advisory.

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The next factor is related to the guidelines. It's a factor that says that the Court should impose a sentence that does not involve an unwarranted disparity between the sentence imposed on Mr. Manafort and the sentence imposed on others convicted of essentially similar conduct. Guidelines help to avoid that.

Well, here we have a very curious situation. We have a violation that for years the Department of Justice, I think for sensible reasons, argued that the guidelines should be 2T rather than 2S, which was a higher guideline for FBAR and tax violations.

Then in December of 2017, the government changed its view, I think, again, for understandable reasons and for reasons that were grounded in the language of the guidelines, to say 2T -- I beg your pardon -- 2S for FBAR violations.

But over the years, there has been a remarkable trend in sentences imposed for this kind of conduct. The sentences have been remarkably light, and I need to take that into account. It is important that the --

(A pause in the proceedings.)

THE COURT: There's been a steady history of the imposition of sentences under FBAR and tax violations, and I want to review that because it furnished the context in which I made my ultimate decision. And let me be clear about that. The guidelines, to most people, would suggest that a sentence

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is somehow an arithmetic calculation, it is not. It is a judgment, and that's an important factor to keep in mind. The guidelines are judgments.

Now, when the guidelines were originally done, what they did is collect historical evidence of sentences and take two standard deviations from the mean of those sentences as the guideline range. Well, they soon ran out of historical information about certain kinds of offenses, so they couldn't do that anymore.

And indeed, for many offenses today for which we have guidelines, there isn't any empirical or historical data. They are judgments by the Sentencing Commission. And in the end, it's a district judge who has to make a sentence -- has to make a judgment about an appropriate sentence.

But it is important to avoid unwarranted disparities. Why? Because it's a fundamental principle of justice that like cases should be treated alike, and if they're treated differently, there ought to be a good reason for it.

Well, there are a number of cases of offshore hiding of money, and some of them are summarized by the defendant in its brief. Some of them I remember because I presided over them. Horsky was the most prominent one. That was a defendant who hid more than \$200 million in offshore accounts, and there was about an \$18 million loss to the government in

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tax revenues. Now, that's roughly three times the amount the loss in this case.

But, Mr. Horsky received from me a sentence of seven months followed by a period of supervised release. Whether that was the right sentence or not is subject to reasonable people differ, as is true with any sentence that I impose. I don't expect the sentence I'm about to announce to meet with everyone's approval. I don't sit to do it that way. I sit to impose a just sentence, and I have to satisfy myself about it.

Now, there's another case, United States against

Kim. That was my case, but ultimately, Judge Brinkema did the sentencing because I recused myself. I recused myself because -- I don't know if this is in the record, and you-all didn't know it -- but I recused myself because Mr. Kim made a very substantial contribution to a university department in which I served as the -- as a -- on the advisory committee, and so I didn't think it was proper for me to sit in that case, and Judge Brinkema didn't know that either.

But that was a case in which he failed to report \$28 million in income hidden in a Swiss bank account.

Now, Mr. Andres correctly points out that all these cases have little differences to them. For example, you would say, well, in the *Kim* case, there weren't any bank fraud.

That's true. And in the *Kim* case, there were other differences between Kim and Manafort, all of which I have to

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take into account, but I still have to consider overall whether there are disparities.

Now, there were others, other cases. I think Horsky was Mr. -- I think it was Mr. Westling who argued. He raised the Desai case and the Ahuja case. There are many others listed in his brief, and he's correct. Some of them, I think, were rather strange.

I think Ms. Curran (ph) was the elderly woman. She was the elderly woman, and she didn't disclose \$47 million in a Swiss bank account, so there was a \$21 million FBAR penalty, and she was sentenced to five seconds of probation, astonishingly. I think that may be a record.

And there are many others in here, and the sentences range from a few months to probation and other things.

All of these cases suggest to me that to impose a sentence of 19 to 24 years on Mr. Manafort would be clearly an unwarranted disparity. The conduct is slightly different, as Mr. Andres points out. There are bank fraud counts here, as there weren't in most of these other cases.

But in the end, I don't think the guidelines range is at all appropriate given the provisions of 3553 and especially the history. There's no doubt that for a long time, the Department of Justice used a different guideline from the one it seeks to enforce today, but I think the Department of Justice, the Government is correct in its

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argument here that 2S not 2T applies, and I've so ruled.

So, deterrence. Mr. Andres argues that he needs to be deterred. I'm not so sure I agree with that, but in any event, I think what I intend to do will deter him. It's far more important, in my view, that this case serve as a beacon to warn others not to engage in hiding income overseas to

7 avoid paying taxes here, because there are serious

8 consequences.

As Mr. Andres and Mr. Downing both know since they've read all my sentencing proceedings, I tell all defendants life is making choices, Mr. Manafort, and then living with the choices you make. You don't determine where you live or to whom you're born or anything of that sort or whether you're born with handicaps or talents, but you do determine how you respond to all of that, and you made choices to engage in criminal conduct, and there will be consequences for those decisions.

I listened carefully to your allocution, and I don't have any doubt that what you said was genuine, but I was surprised that I did not hear you express regret for engaging in wrongful conduct. In other words, you didn't say, I really, really regret not doing what I knew the law required.

Now, that doesn't make any difference to the judgment that I'm about to make, Mr. Manafort, that you didn't say that, but I hope you will reflect on that and that your

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regret will be that you didn't comply with the law. That should be your true regret, and you should have remorse for that, and I certainly recommend that you do it in the District of Columbia, because you'll have that opportunity.

So the main factor that I think is operative here on 3553 is I need to impose a sentence that reflects the seriousness of the offense, promotes respect for the law, provides just punishment, and does not involve -- the other important thing, it does not involve unwarranted disparities.

The government cannot sweep away the history of all these previous sentences. It cannot sweep away the history of having advocated the application of 2T rather than 2S to these types of offenses.

Now, so we are now at the end where I have to exercise this judgment. And I repeat, it's not a mathematical calculation. It is a judgment, but it is a judgment guided by all the factors that you have raised in your counsel's briefs and the government has raised in its briefs.

Now, let me mention one other thing. I was curious about the Sentencing Commission's experience or statistics on 2S1.3. Very, very few cases from 19- -- or from 2008 to 2017. Very few cases, but of those cases, the substantial majority all ended up with sentences below the guideline range. And I exclude from that the substantial assistance ones. Still a majority of all the rest of them, which doesn't surprise me.

-U.S. v. Manafort-87 1 Now, to pronounce sentence. It is the judgment of 2 this Court, Mr. Manafort, that you be sentenced, that you be 3 committed to the custody of Bureau of Prisons for the 4 following terms: With respect to Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, those 5 counts are counts of subscribing to false United States 6 7 individual income tax returns for -- those are counts which 8 involve a maximum term of three years. For those counts, I 9 impose a sentence, that is, I commit you to the custody of 10 Bureau of Prisons for a period of 24 months for Count 1, 24 11 months for Count 2, 24 months for Count 3, 24 months for Count 12 4, and 24 months for Count 5, all of which is to be served 13 concurrently. Now, with respect to Count 11 or 12 -- which one is 14 15 it? I've forgotten the number. 16 MR. ANDRES: 12, Your Honor. THE COURT: 12. That's the failure to file reports 17 of foreign income -- foreign bank and financial accounts. 18 19 The maximum penalty for that is, Mr. Asonye, 20 Mr. Andres, I think it's ten years? 21 MR. ANDRES: Five years, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: Five years. All right. For that, it is 23 the judgment of this Court -- it's really the same offense as 24 the others, so I'm going to impose a sentence of 30 months on that, to run concurrently to the 24-month sentences imposed on 25

-U.S. v. Manafort-88 1 Counts 1 through 5. 2 Then we come to Counts 27 and 28, the bank fraud. 3 MR. ANDRES: 25 and 27, Your Honor. THE COURT: 25 and --4 5 MR. ANDRES: 27. 6 THE COURT: And 27. Now, those counts for bank 7 fraud have a maximum of 30 years, as I recall; is that 8 correct? MR. ANDRES: Correct. Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. And I take into account a 10 11 number of factors there, but it is the judgment of this Court 12 that you be committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons 13 for a period of 47 months. That term is to be served 14 concurrently with the other terms. So you have a total 15 sentence of 47 months. 16 I took into account, Mr. Manafort, your personal 17 history and characteristics. I think I might have been a 18 little more impressed if you'd been able to resolve your IRS 19 and other problems, but I hope you will still do that. 20 So I have imposed a sentence -- did I say 47? 21 MR. ANDRES: Yes, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: Yes, 47 months, and that's total; in 23 other words, that's concurrent. 24 It's more severe than most of the cases cited by the 25 defendant, significantly more. I've taken into account all of

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the criminal conduct that's been found by the jury and admitted by you, Mr. Manafort, and I'm convinced that's a just sentence for that conduct.

The government didn't argue for a guideline sentence, which I thought was a good thing. Then I would have concluded that it was vindictive, because clearly the guidelines were way out of whack on this, as the history of the sentences in this area show.

I'm going to require that he pay a \$100 special assessment for each count, and that total can easily be added up.

I'm going to require that he serve -- I think the supervised release period for the tax counts is one year; is that correct?

THE PROBATION: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So he'll get one year of supervised release for each of the first five counts, and that term is to run concurrently. He will get a period of supervised release to follow any period of incarceration of three years with respect to the FBAR count. That provides for at least three years. And three years for the two bank fraud counts. All of those terms are to run concurrently.

Now, as a special condition of his supervised release, he is to comply with the terms of this restitution order. Now, the restitution order isn't in a final form. I'm

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1	going to waive interest, and the amount of \$25,000,815 is due
2	and payable immediately.
3	The paragraph 3 that troubled me, can you read to me
4	now how it reads?
5	MR. ASONYE: It reads: "The amount of restitution
6	paid to any entity shall not exceed the entity's total loss
7	from the offenses of conviction. Any amount paid to an entity
8	under an order of restitution shall be reduced by an amount
9	later recovered for the same loss by the victim in any federal
10	or state civil proceeding."
11	THE COURT: All right. You'll have to submit a new
12	restitution order with that language in it.
13	I think that language is appropriate, Mr. Westling.
14	MR. WESTLING: That's correct, Your Honor.
15	THE COURT: Now, I take your point you don't want to
16	sign it, and that's perfectly appropriate. You don't need to
17	do it, but I want you to be able to say to me why you don't
18	think that I thought the language I was originally
19	presented with was clearly not appropriate, but this one does
20	sound appropriate.
21	In other words, I don't want your client paying in
22	restitution more than these people really lose.
23	MR. WESTLING: Correct, Your Honor.
24	THE COURT: And the restitution order also doesn't
25	show what I want it to show, Mr. Asonye, and that is that

	U.S. v. Manafort
	91
1	first I want him to pay restitution to the United States, not
2	to these banks.
3	MR. ASONYE: Your Honor, I believe by law that the
4	banks are due, I think it's under 3664(i), the banks must be
5	paid first before the United States.
6	THE COURT: That's a mistake because that cheats the
7	rest of us. All right.
8	But I wanted to well, I'm not going to impose
9	interest. And I'm going to say that he's to pay it in \$100 a
10	month or 25 percent of his net income 60 days after release
11	from any period of confinement.
12	Now, we come to the issue of a fine.
13	Is there a request first of all, Mr. Downing, is
14	there a request for a designation?
15	MR. DOWNING: Yes, Your Honor.
16	THE COURT: In this area so that he may be near his
17	family?
18	MR. DOWNING: We would request a designation to the
19	federal prison camp at Cumberland, Maryland.
20	THE COURT: All right. I will make that
21	recommendation. It's consistent with his security needs.
22	Can you-all wait until I've recessed? In the
23	future, please do so.
24	All right. Go on.
25	MR. DOWNING: Your Honor, one other issue we'd like

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    to raise, and I don't know that we need to raise it right now,
 1
 2
    but it has to do with whether or not you can order this
 3
    sentence to be concurrently served with --
 4
              THE COURT: I can't, but she can.
 5
              MR. DOWNING: Thank you, Your Honor.
 6
              THE COURT: I don't believe I can. If you find in
 7
    the law that I'm incorrect, you can bring that to my
    attention.
 8
              MR. DOWNING: Thank you, Your Honor.
10
              THE COURT: But I think it is entirely up to her
11
    whether any sentence she imposes is to run concurrent to this
12
    sentence. It's up to her. But if you find that I'm
13
    incorrect, that I have that discretion or that power, you
14
    may -- and that will be after she completes her sentencing --
15
    then you can return.
16
              Anything else, Mr. Downing?
17
              MR. DOWNING: No, Your Honor.
18
              THE COURT: Mr. Andres?
19
              MR. ANDRES: Mr. Asonye just has some minor
20
    housekeeping issues, Your Honor.
21
              MR. ASONYE: Your Honor, two issues: the issue of
    the fine -- of the amount of the fine.
22
23
              THE COURT: All right.
24
              MR. ASONYE: And also the government would request
25
    three additional conditions of supervised release when it's
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 1
    appropriate, Your Honor.
 2
              THE COURT: Well, go ahead and tell me what they
 3
    are.
              MR. ASONYE: Sure. Well, actually, I believe the
 4
    Court covered the first one, but explicitly to pay restitution
 5
 6
    of $6,164,032 to the IRS in the supervised release.
 7
              THE COURT: That's in the 28 million.
 8
              MR. ASONYE: Yes, it is, but, Your Honor, we always
9
    ask for it when it's paid to the IRS as a condition of
10
    supervised release.
11
              THE COURT: Well, I should do it because you always
12
    ask for it? I'm not persuaded.
13
              What's your next one?
              MR. ASONYE: Again, in white collar cases, Your
14
15
    Honor, the government typically asks that a condition of
16
    supervised release, that the defendant not open any new credit
17
    lines without the approval of the Court or probation.
18
              THE COURT: Yes, I typically do that. I'll add that
19
    condition.
20
              What else.
21
              MR. ASONYE: And finally, that the defendant not
22
    engage in any transactions above $10,000 without the approval
23
    of the Court or probation.
24
              THE COURT: Any objection to that, Mr. Downing?
25
              MR. WESTLING: We do object to that, Your Honor. I
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-U.S. v. Manafort-94 1 don't see there's a basis here if a credit condition is 2 sufficient. He'll have to report his financials on a regular basis to the probation officer as part of any supervised 3 release term. I think it's excessive. 4 THE COURT: I will require that he comply with any 5 request by the probation officer for financial information. 6 7 That's what I will require. MR. ASONYE: Thank you, Your Honor. 8 9 THE COURT: All right. Anything else, Mr. Downing? So we have only the issue of a fine. 10 11 MR. DOWNING: Nothing else, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: I would impose a significant fine in this case if it were not for the fact that there is a 13 14 \$24 million restitution. 15 Now, as Mr. Andres pointed out, it may not come to 16 24 million. It may be -- or Mr. Asonye, I don't remember 17 which, but one of you pointed out, correctly, I think, that 18 ultimately his restitution may not be 24 million. It may be 19 less. It's never going to be less than 6 million, but it may 20 be less. 21 Is that right, Mr. Asonye? 22 MR. ASONYE: That's correct, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: But 6 million is still a pretty 24 significant amount of restitution, and I often do not impose a 25 punitive fine where there is restitution in that amount. But

-U.S. v. Manafort-95 1 you also point out that he has two very substantial assets, 2 two homes. 3 What I'm going to do in this case -- what is the 4 quideline range on fines? THE PROBATION: Your Honor, the low end is \$50,000. 5 THE COURT: What's the upper range? 6 7 THE PROBATION: 25 million. THE COURT: \$50,000 fine. If I had more 8 9 information, it might be more, but it's punitive, and I think 10 what I've done is sufficiently punitive. 11 If anybody in this courtroom doesn't think so, go 12 and spend a day in the jail or penitentiary of the federal 13 government. Spend a week there. He has to spend 47 months, but he will receive credit for time already served. 14 15 Now, I want to remove any doubt about that. So what I'm going to do is enter an order nunc pro tunc that -- that 16 his bond violation occurred, because there was an adjudication 17 18 of that in another forum, but I'm going to make that nunc pro 19 tunc so he should receive credit for that. And the reason for 20 that is that if he had been incarcerated by both Judge Jackson 21 and by this Court, he would still receive credit for both, and 22 I want him to receive credit for the nine months. 23 It may be a matter of some interest, Mr. Downing, 24 for you to tell everybody here, I know I've received 25 information about it, why has Mr. Manafort been in isolation?

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1	MR. DOWNING: Your Honor, with respect to the
2	Marshals Service and the local sheriff's office that are
3	maintaining Mr. Manafort
4	THE COURT: So they do it because they want to
5	protect his personal safety?
6	MR. DOWNING: Correct, from the general population.
7	It's purely a safety issue because the thought is that if
8	Mr. Manafort would be in the general population, that there
9	are many folks out there that would want to do harm or
10	violence to him.
11	THE COURT: Yes. And I will point out that I
12	received a lot of nutty communications which I have neither
13	read nor kept. That won't surprise anybody in the courtroom.
14	Maybe they're the authors. I don't know. I don't care.
15	Anything further today, Mr. Andres?
16	MR. ANDRES: No, Your Honor. Thank you very much.
17	THE COURT: Mr. Downing?
18	MR. DOWNING: Nothing further, Your Honor.
19	THE COURT: All right. I thank counsel for your
20	cooperation. Court stands in recess.
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22	(Proceedings adjourned at 7:08 p.m.)
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## 1 CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER 2 3 I, Tonia Harris, an Official Court Reporter for 4 the Eastern District of Virginia, do hereby certify that I reported by machine shorthand, in my official capacity, the 5 proceedings had and testimony adduced upon the Sentencing 6 7 hearing in the case of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA versus 8 PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR., Criminal Action No. 1:18-CR-83, in said court on the 7th day of March, 2019. 9 10 I further certify that the foregoing 97 pages constitute the official transcript of said proceedings, as 11 12 taken from my machine shorthand notes, my computer realtime 13 display, together with the backup tape recording of said 14 proceedings to the best of my ability. In witness whereof, I have hereto subscribed my 15 16 name, this March 7, 2019. 17 18 19 2.0 21 Tonia M. Harris, RPR 22 Official Court Reporter 23 24 25